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This is a transferred matter from the Federal High Court, Lagos Division. The transfer was consequent upon the 3rd Alteration to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which vested employment related disputes to this court. The claimant commenced the suit by filing Originating Summons against the defendants at the Federal High Court, Lagos on the 19th May, 2011 as Suit No. FHC/L/CS/599/11 which was transferred to this court on 20th June 2012. In the said Originating Summons, the claimant prayed for the determination of the following questions: (1) Whether the 1st and 2nd defendants can validly reach a decision on the retirement of the applicant without affording the applicant the opportunity to be heard on the complaint(s) or other matters upon which that decision is based. (2) Whether in view of the failure to afford the applicant the opportunity to be heard on the complaints on which the decision to retire him is based, the purported retirement of the applicant by the 1st and 2nd defendants on the 23rd day of March 2007 is not a nullity being a violation of the applicant’s constitutional right to fair hearing. (3) Whether the 1st and 2nd defendants can validly retire the applicant when the applicant has not violated any conditions of his employment and has not been in the employment of the 2nd defendant for 35 years or attained the mandatory retirement age of 60 years. (4) Whether it is not ultra vires the House of Representatives to embark on a review of the administrative actions of the 1st and 2nd defendants particularly in relation to the retirement of officers in the employment of the 2nd defendant. (5) Whether the resolution of the House of Representatives to the effect that having paid the three months salary in lieu of notice, the Agency should immediately proceed to pay the gratuities and pensions of the affected staff as due process has been established to have been following is therefore not illegal, invalid, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. (6) Whether the 1st and 2nd defendants are not obligated to comply with the decision of the 3rd defendant to reinstate the applicant to his office as contained in the 3rd defendant’s letter of 3rd November, 2010. (7) Whether in view of the fact that the applicant has satisfied the condition laid down by the 3rd defendant to withdrawing Suit No. FHC/L/CS/819/10, the defendants are not estopped from resiling from the decision to reinstate the applicant to his employment with the 2nd defendant as contained in the 3rd defendant’s letter of 3rd November, 2010. AND B. Upon the determination of the question set out above in favour of the applicants, for the following reliefs: (1) A declaration that the 1st and 2nd defendants cannot validly reach a decision on the retirement of the applicant without affording the applicant the opportunity to be heard on the complaint(s) or other matters upon which that decision is based. (2) A declaration that the purported retirement of the applicant by the 1st and 2nd defendants vide a letter dated the 23rd day of March, 2007 without affording the applicant the opportunity to be heard on the complaint(s) or other matters upon which that decision is based amount to a violation of the applicant’s constitutional right to fair hearing and is invalid, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. (3) A declaration that the 1st and 2nd defendants cannot validly retire the applicant when the applicant has not violated any conditions of his employment and has not been in the employment of the 2nd defendant for 35 years or attained the mandatory retirement age of 60 years. (4) A declaration that it is ultra vires the House of Representative to embark on a review of the administrative actions of the 1st and 2nd defendants particularly in relation to the retirement of officers in the employment of the 2nd defendant. (5) A declaration that the resolution of the House of Representative to the effect that “having paid the three months salary in lieu of notice, the agency should immediately proceed to pay the gratuities and pensions of the affected staff as due process has been established to have been followed” is illegal, invalid, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. (6) An order directing the 1st and 2nd defendants to reinstate the applicant to his employment with the 2nd defendant and restore to him all the accrued benefits and appurtenances of his office within 7 days from the date of the order. (7) An order of mandatory injunction compelling the 1st and 2nd defendants to comply with the directive of the 3rd defendant to reinstate the applicant to his office as contained in the 3rd defendant’s letter of 3rd November, 2010. (8) A declaration that the defendants are estopped from resiling from the decision to reinstate the applicant to his employment with the 2nd defendant as contained in the 3rd defendant’s letter of 3rd November, 2010 to the 1st and 2nd defendants. (9) An order directing the 1st and 2nd defendants to pay to the applicant all his salary together with other accrued allowances and emoluments from the 27th day of March, 2007 until he is reinstated. (10) Interest on all such accrued sums at the rate of 18% until such sums are liquidated by the 1st and 2nd respondents. The claimant filed also by leave of court an amended general form of complaint, witness statement on oath, list of documents to be relied on at the trial and exhibits. The 1st and 2nd defendants in reaction filed a statement of defence and notice of preliminary objection. In a motion on notice dated 19th February, 2013 but filed on the 20th February 2013, the 1st and 2nd defendants prayed this court as follows: (a) An order setting down the preliminary objection that this suit be dismissed on the ground that it is statute barred. (b) And any further order(s) as this court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The grounds upon which the application is brought in addition to those contained in the accompanying affidavit are as follows: (i) This court lacked jurisdiction to entertain this suit because it was filed about four years and two months from the date of compulsory retirement. (ii) The court lacked jurisdiction to entertain this suit having regard to the true and proper meaning and intendment of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap p. 41 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. (iii) That the present Suit is incompetent and therefore ought to be dismissed. The application is supported by a five paragraph affidavit sworn to by one Nnanna Alamezie, a public servant with the 2nd defendant. He deposed that this action was instituted by way of Originating Summons at the Federal High Court, Lagos. That the claimant took out the Originating Summons against 1st and 2nd applicants on the 19th May, 2011 in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/599/11 which case was subsequently transferred to this court and registered as Suit No. NICN/LA/102/2012 on the 20/6/12. That the claimant was compulsorily retired from services of the applicants on the 23rd March, 2007. That the claimant did not commence action against the applicants until the 19th May, 2011, a period of about four (4) years and two (2) months after the compulsory retirement. He deposed that the preliminary objection borders on statute of limitation and the objection can determine the claimant’s suit once and for all if it succeeded. That the claimant will not be prejudiced by this application as it is in the interest of justice to dispose of the preliminary point of law raised in this case. Learned Counsel to the applicants raised three issues for determination as follows: 1. Whether this suit is statute barred against the defendants in view of the provision 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act Cap 41, LFN, 2004. 2. Whether having regard to provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41 LFN, 2004 the claimant has any enforceable right of action against the defendants. 3. Whether this court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Learned Counsel argued all the issues together. He submitted that this suit is statute barred against the defendants in the light of the provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, Cap 41, LFN, 2004. He pointed out that this suit is challenging the retirement of the claimant from the 2nd defendant via a letter dated 23rd March, 2007. That the alleged act or default of the defendants which is the subject matter of this suit occurred on 23rd May, 2007. He submitted that the cause of action in this suit arose on 23rd March, 2007 while the claimant commenced this suit on 19th May, 2011 and registered in this court on 20th June, 2012. He argued further that time begins to run against a person in whose favour any cause of action has arisen from the date the said cause of action arose. He referred the court to the case of Grains Production Agency v. Charles Ezegbulem [1999] 1 NWLR (pt. 587) p. 408. He cited Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, as follows: “Where any action, prosecution, or other proceedings is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such act, law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall be effect – (a) the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or in the case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next the ceasing thereof.” Learned Counsel submitted that the claimant’s cause of action arose on 23rd March, 2007 and time began to run against the claimant from that date. That this suit was filed on 19th May, 2011 a period of four years and two months after the cause of action arose. He submitted, therefore, that the claimant’s claim having been instituted within the stipulated period of three months under the Public Officers Act is statute barred. He relied on the case of Ogundipe v. NDIC [2008] All FWLR (pt. 432) p. 1220 to buttress the point that the court is required to look at the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim to determine of the matter is statute barred. He also cited the case of Grains Production Agency v. Charles Ezegbulem (supra) at p. 408, Muhammed v. Military Administrator Plateau State [2001] 16 NWLR (pt. 740) p. 545. Learned Counsel also referred the court to paragraph 7 of the claimant’s Amended Statement of Claim where the claimant averred that on 23rd March, 2007 he received a letter purporting to retire him from the service of the 2nd defendant. He submitted that the term “person” under Section 2 (a) of Public Officers Protection Act includes public offices and public authorities. He relied on the cases of Offoboche v. Ogoja Local Government [2001] 16 NWLR (pt. 739) p. 489, Ibrahim v. J.S.C [1998] 14 NWLR (pt. 584) p. 1 at 38. He submitted further that the defendants in this suit are public officers within the scope of Section 2 (a) of Public Officers Protection Act. He submitted that where the claimant’s action is statute barred, the proper order for the court to make is that of dismissal. He found reliance on the cases of Ebioye v. NNPC [1994] 5 NWLR (pt. 347) p. 649, NPA Plc v. Lotus Plastics Ltd [2005] 19 NWLR (pt. 959) p. 158. Finally, Learned Counsel submitted that the claimant has no enforceable right of action against the defendants. That the claimant has no locus to institute and maintain this action against the defendants. In opposition, Learned Counsel to the claimant filed Written Address dated 5th March, 2012. He raised lone issue for determination as “whether in view of the cause of action and the reliefs sought in this suit, this action is statute barred”. He submitted that for the purpose of determining issues raised at this stage of the proceedings the court is bound to consider the claimant’s case as presented in the originating process. He relied on the case of UBN Plc v. Umeoduagu [2004] 13 NWLR (pt. 890) p. 352. That the court ought to consider the complaint and statement of claim to determine whether this action is statute barred in relation to Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. Learned Counsel submitted further that Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to causes of action founded on contract of employment. He relied on the cases of Alapiti Governor Rivers State [1991] 8 NWLR (pt. 211) p. 575, Oduko v. Government of Ebonyi State [2004] 12 NWLR (pt. 891) p. 487, F.G.N v. Zebra Energy Ltd [2002] 18 NWLR (pt. 798) p. 162, Nigerian Ports Authority v. Construzion General Farsura Cogefar SPA [1974] All NLR (pt. 2), Okeke v. Baba [2000] 3 NWLR (pt. 650) p. 644. Learned Counsel further submitted that the case of Unilorin v. Adediran relied upon by the defendants/applicants would not avail them having regard to the circumstances of this case. He argued that the defedant in that case did not avail the Court of Appeal with the decision of the Supreme Court in F.G.N v. Zebra Energy Ltd (supra). That based on doctrine of stare decisis this court is bound by the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in F.G.N v. Zebra Energy Ltd (supra). Learned Counsel submitted that the correct position of the law in relation to the inapplicability of Section 2 (a) of Public Officers (Protection) Act to contracts of employment is as stated in F.G.N v. Zebra Energy Ltd (supra) as this position of the law has not been overturned by the Supreme Court. He submitted further that this action is not statute barred as same is founded on a contract of employment which is not within the contemplation of the Public Officers Protection Act. That the provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Act will not avail the defendants/applicants in the circumstances of this case where the acts complained of were not done in good faith. He relied on the cases of Unilorin v. Adediran [2007] 6 NWLR (pt. 1031) p. 498, Hassan v. Aliyu [2000] 17 NWLR (pt. 1223) p. 547. He added that from paragraphs 5 to 28 of the Amended Statement of Facts it is clear that the compulsory retirement of the claimant was not carried out in good faith and there is no justification for same. He urged the court to dismiss this application. In his Reply on Points of Law, Learned Counsel to the defendants argued that the right to institute an action is not a perpetual one but limited by statute. He relied upon the case of Onadeko v. U.B.N Plc [2005] All FWLR (pt. 250) p. 57. He submitted that the Public Officers Protection Act applies to cases of contract of employment as divorced from other types of specific contracts, citing the case of Sanda v. Kukawa Local Government [1991] 2 NWLR (pt. 174) p. 379. That Section 175 of the Local Government Law of Borno State considered by the Supreme Court in that case is in pari materia with Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act applies to cases of contract of employment. He also cited the case of Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State (supra). Learned Counsel submitted that cases of contract where the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply are cases of specific contracts are clearly distinguished from contracts of employment. On non applicability of the Public Officers Protection Act to specific contracts, Learned Counsel relied on the cases of Osun State Govt. v. Dalami (Nig) Ltd [2007] All FWLR (pt. 365) p. 438, Hon. Justice J. U. Obasse v. National Judicial Council & Ors [2008] All FWLR (pt. 434) p. 1637, Tajudeen v. Customs, Immigration and Prisons Services Board [2010] All FWLR page 1740. On the contention of the claimant that his retirement was done in bad faith, Learned Counsel submitted that the acts of the alleged bad faith complained by the claimant were not existing before or at the time the defendants compulsorily retired the claimant on 23rd March, 2007 as they did not influence the defendants at the time of the retirement because the fact of arrest and seizure of drugs were not known to the defendants and they did not constitute any act of malice on their part. He also argued that it has not been shown that the defendants through the Governing Board were acting outside their lawful duties by retiring the claimant on the 23/3/2007. He urged the court to hold that the claimant’s case is statute barred and to dismiss same. I have carefully perused the processes filed, the submission of counsel for both parties and the authorities cited. In my view, the issue for determination is whether the claimant’s action is statute barred”. The defendants are essentially asking this court to dismiss this suit because it is statute barred having been instituted against a Public Officer outside three months after the cause of action occurred contrary to Section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. There is plethora of cases to the effect that in considering whether a particular case is statute barred, the Statement of Claim of the Plaintiff is the place to turn. See Ibafon Co. Ltd v. Nigerian Ports Authority Plc [2000] 8 NWLR (pt.667) p. 86 at p. 100. The Claimant’s action was originally filed at the Federal High Court, Lagos Division with Suit No. FHC/L/CS/599/11 on the 19th day of May, 2011. The matter was thereafter transferred to this court and was received on 21st March, 2012 and was given Suit No. NICN/LA/102/2012, therefore, continuing the life of the suit. The claimant in this suit, among other reliefs, pray for declaration that the defendant cannot reach decision on his retirement without giving him fair hearing, a declaration that his retirement by virtue of a letter dated 23rd March, 2007 is invalid, null and void and of no effect, a declaration that the 1st and 2nd defendants cannot validly retire him when he has not violated conditions of his employment. In essence, the claimant’s claim is challenging his retirement by the 2nd defendant. To determine this application, it is important to reproduce relevant Section of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. Public Officers (Protection) Act, Cap. P41, LFN, 2004 provides in Section 2(a) a follows: “Where any action, prosecution, or other proceedings is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provision shall have effect— (a) The action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.” In view of the above cited law, any person who intends to sue a public officer must do so within three (3) months of the cause of action, otherwise the action becomes statute barred. The action of the defendants which is being challenged by the claimant is his retirement from the services of the 2nd defendant. The said act is contained in the letter dated 23rd March, 2007 retiring the claimant. It follows, therefore, that the claimant’s cause of action arose on the 23rd day of March, 2007 when he was retired from the services of the 2nd defendant. This suit was commenced on the 19th of May, 2011 which is well over four (4) years after the accrual of the cause of action. The claimant’s action is, therefore, statute barred. The Public Officers (Protection) Act is a statute of limitation. The general principle of law is that where a statute provides for the institution of an action within a prescribed period, the action shall not be brought after the time prescribed by such statute. Any action that is instituted after the period stipulated by the statute is totally barred as the right of the plaintiff or the injured person to commence the action would have been extinguished by such law. See A.G Rivers State v. AG Bayelsa State [2013] 3 NWLR (pt.1340) p.123, PHCN v. Alabi [2010] 21 N.L.L.R (pt. 58) p. 1 at p. 20, Ibrahim v. J.S.C [1998] 14 NWLR (584) p. 1, Unilorin v. Adeniran [2007] 6 NWLR (pt 1031) p. 498 at p. 521, Egbe v. Adefarasin [1985] 1 NWLR (p. 3) p. 549 at p. 568, Woherem v. Emereuwa [2000] 3 NWLR (pt. 650) p. 529, Bank of the North v. Gana [2006] All FWLR (296) p. 826. See also Sunday Adesina Adenuga v. Lagos State Civil Service Commission & Ors. unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/525/2012, delivered on April 10, 2014. I therefore in the circumstance find that this action is statute barred. Having found that the claim of the claimant is statute barred, the proper order that is to be made is one of dismissal. Accordingly, the claim of the claimant is hereby dismissed. I make no order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu Fishim Judge