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By a Complaint, Statement of Facts and accompanying processes dated the 27th day of June 2013 and filed on the same date, the Claimant claims against the defendants jointly and severally as follows: 1. Assignment of the Claimant to official duties befitting his status as permanent staff within the establishment of the first defendant as presently constituted. 2. Payment of all outstanding arrears and entitlements from October 2010 to date to the Claimant amounting to N2,210,000.00 (Two Million, Two Hundred and Ten Thousand Naira) only. 3. Continuation of employment of the Claimant from the present period till his (Claimant’s) retirement as a staff of the first Defendant at Statutory retirement age of 70 years in 2052 4. AN UNDERTAKING signed by the management of the first defendant to the effect that the claimant herein shall not at anytime and under any circumstance be victimized on the account of this suit or for pursuing his rights in relation to his employment with the first defendant. 5. In the ALTERNATIVE, payment of the sum of N500,000,000.00 (Five Hundred Million Naira) in SPECIAL and GENERAL DAMAGES for breach of contract of employment (as calculated). By a motion on notice dated and filed the 10th day of January 2014, the 1st, 3rd and 4th defendants prayed the court for an order dismissing the suit of the Claimant for lack of jurisdiction, in that the claim is statute barred. The application, which is supported by a 16 paragraph affidavit and a written address, was brought on the ground that the claim of the claimant as constituted is statute barred by reason of the provisions of Section 73 of the Abia State College of Technology Aba Law, 2009 which provides as follows: (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, no action shall be instituted in any court against the College or its members or staff in respect of any official act or neglect, unless such action is commenced within three months next after the occurrence of the act or neglect complained of. (2) In the case of a continuous damage or injury, such action shall be instituted within three months from the date of abatement of such damage or injury. A single issue was proffered for the court’s determination as follows: “Whether this honourable court has jurisdiction to hear this suit which was commenced on June 27 2013 when the Claimant’s cause of action if any arose in October 2010.” In challenging the jurisdiction of the court, the applicants submitted that the averments in the Claimant’s Statement of Claim precludes the claimant from filing this action when he did. By the said averments, the cause of action arose in October 2010 when the Claimant was employed by the 1st defendant. By the authority of Agaka vs. Ayilara (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 608) Pg. 899 at 922, a cause of action arises on the date of occurrence, neglect or default complained of and not the consequence or result of any of the above. Arguing further on the point that the Claimant’s cause of action arose in October 2010, the applicants referred to the Statement of Claim which has unequivocally stated that the incidence for which the Claimant has approached the court for relief happened in October 2010. That is to say he was offered employment and he rendered services to the 1st defendant in October 2010 as a lecturer during the accreditation exercise carried out on the 1st defendant by the 6th defendant and yet, the 1st defendant declined to perfect the employment of the Claimant. That the authority of CRUTECH vs. Obeten (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 641) Pg. 1567 at 1583 is clear on the point that the cause of action accrues on the particular date which gave rise to the incidence in question. Having waited till June 27 2013 to file this action, the applicants submitted, that the Claimant has clearly exceeded the time frame allowed by Section 73 of the Abia State College of Health Technology Aba Law, 2009 which is three months, thereby robbing this court of jurisdiction to entertain this action. The justiciability or otherwise of a cause action becomes irrelevant once the action is brought outside the time limit. The cause of action therefore abates and ceases to exist once it is statute barred. See Kolawole vs. Olori (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 514) Pg. 35 at 115. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the action. In reaction to the application for dismissal, the Claimant on the 3rd February 2014, vide a motion for extension of time, filed a 23 paragraph counter affidavit and a written address wherein arguments were canvassed to the effect that Paragraph 11 of the Statement of Defence clearly raised an allegation of fraud by stating thus: “…..the 1st, 3rd and 4th defendants state that the letter titled OFFER OF APPOINTMENT and dated January 10, 2010 was not issued by the 1st Defendant and is a fraud.” To the Claimant, causes or matters founded upon or involving fraud or concealed fraud ought not to be caught up by any limitation of time. He relied on the Supreme Court authority of Michael Arowolo vs. Chief Titus Ifabiyi (2002) 19 WRN Pg. 111-132. The appellant in that case had fraudulently made use of the respondent’s title documents to mortgage the respondent’s house for a loan. The respondent filed an action only when he became aware of the respondent’s fraudulent act. The Supreme Court held, relying on the Privy Council decision in Bulli Coal mining Co. vs. Patrick Osborne & Anor (1899) A.C. 351 at 363 (PC) that under such circumstance, no length of time can be a bar to the respondent’s action. The statute of limitation will not therefore apply against the person defrauded, in case of concealed fraud, so long as the party defrauded remains in ignorance. Approaching the court for redress the moment he becomes aware of the fraud can therefore be sustained. The Claimant proceeded to state that he never knew that the OFFER OF APPOINTMENT dated January 10, 2010 was “a fraud” until the Defence stated so in paragraph 11 of the Statement of Defence. He therefore submitted that where a concealed fraud is involved as in the present case, time does not begin to run against the Claimant; and that the fact that the fraud was declared by the defence amounts to an admission, and therefore needs no further proof. The Claimant, being completely ignorant of this fact, should therefore not be a victim. Counsel submitted that Section 73(1) of the Abia State College of Technology Aba Law of 2009 never applied ab initio to this suit since from the cases cited, time never started to run against the Claimant in filing this suit, as equity would not allow the defendants to profit from their concealed fraud against the innocent claimant. The court was urged to assume jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit, and dismiss this application. The 1st, 3rd and 4th defendants on the 27th day of February 2014, filed a reply on points of law wherein they urged the court to discountenance the averments in Paragraphs 7, 14, 16, 20, 21 and 22 of the Claimant’s counter-affidavit as they contravene Section 115(2) the Evidence Act. They further submitted that the totality of the Claimant’s argument in opposition to the application is that there is existence of concealed fraud, therefore the suit is not statute barred. The court was urged to discountenance the Claimant’s averments and arguments as they are based on the averments in the Statement of Defence. The position of the law is clear as stated in Elabanjo vs Dawodu (2006) All FWLR Pt. 328 Pg. 604 at 646 where the Supreme Court held that the period of limitation is determined by looking at the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim alleging when the wrong was committed, and comparing it with when the action was filed. See also Kabir vs. Action Congress (2012) All FWLR Pt. 647 Pg. 638. The duty of the court is therefore to examine the writ of summons and the statement of claim and no other pleading or court process. Reference was made to the ruling of this court delivered on 15th January 2014 in Agboroh vs. WAEC (unreported) Suit No NICN/EN/156/2013 where the court restricted itself to the Statement of Claim in determining limitation of action. The applicants also pointed out that the Claimants did not refer the court to any authority allowing the court to look at any other process before the court in determining whether or not the suit is statute barred. I have considered the submissions of the parties, the various affidavits and written addresses, and I have chosen to adopt a sole issue for determination, which is “whether the suit is statute barred.” It is trite law that where a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action should be brought, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. An action instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period is said to be statute-barred. See Aboyeji vs. Lateju (2011) LPELR-3572 (CA); Ogunko vs. Shelle (2004) 6 NWLR (Pt. 868) 17. Briefly Stated, the facts of the Claimant’s case as pleaded in his Statement of Facts is that the claimant applied for employment as an Anatomy lecturer with the 1st defendant vide an application for employment dated 3rd March 2010. In August 2010, the 5th defendant gave the Claimant a letter dated January 10, 2010 and titled OFFER OF APPOINTMENT. The claimant participated in the accreditation exercise that was conducted by the 6th defendant in October 2010. After the accreditation exercise, the claimant expected to be assigned to duties by the 1st defendant and to be paid his monthly salary, but none of such things happened. The Claimant went to the office of the 5th defendant to make a formal complaint and protest, and the response of the 5th defendant was that the name of the Claimant was not on the first defendant’s payroll. No further explanation was given in that regard. In September 2012, the Claimant’s solicitors wrote to the defendants, demanding performance of their part of the contract of employment. A second letter was written by the solicitor on 4th October 2012, giving notice of claimant’s intention to sue the defendants for breach of contract of employment. In response to the 2nd letter (Pre-action notice), the 1st defendant wrote a letter dated 16th October 2012 wherein it was stated that the claimant was one of the personnel “hired” for the accreditation exercise by the 6th defendant (NBTE) in October 2010 as a “service staff”, and that he was adequately remunerated along with others at the end of the exercise. By the said letter, the 1st defendant denied any obligation to retain the claimant’s services, as the minimum requirement for the post of a lecturer is a “second class” degree and not a “third class” which the claimant possesses. This fact was stated to have been made known to the claimant through the office of the registrar (the 5th defendant). It is noted, and indeed curiously too, from the Statement of Facts, that the Claimant applied for a job with the 1st Defendant vide an application for employment dated 3rd March 2010. Yet the appointment letter given to the Claimant was dated January 2010. Paragraph 13 of the Statement of Facts states thus: “Even though the said letter of Appointment was given to the Claimant in August 2010, it was, for reasons best known to the 1st Defendant, backdated to January 2010.” There is no indication that the Claimant sought to clarify this anomaly, or whether the letter dated January 2010 was indeed in response to the application dated March 2010. I will not proceed on this premise, as it will be academic. The Claimant has stated that he only became aware of the allegation of fraud when the defence filed its statement of defence. The Claimant has placed heavy reliance on the Supreme Court authority of Michael Arowolo vs. Chief Titus Ifabiyi (2002) 19 WRN Pg. 111-132 where it was held that the statute of limitation will not apply in the case of concealment of fraud. He has argued that the allegation of fraud raised in the Statement of Defence removes this suit from those to which the statute of limitation will apply. I will point out at this point that the allegation of fraud or concealment of fraud to which the authority cited by the claimant refers, would be an allegation raised by a claimant or a plaintiff. By this I mean that if the said allegation of fraud was raised by the claimant in this case, then the authority of Arowolo vs. Ifabiyi may possibly apply. The appellant in the Arowolo case cited had fraudulently made use of the respondent’s title documents to mortgage the respondent’s house for a loan. The respondent filed an action only when he became aware of the appellant’s fraudulent act. The title documents were not fraudulent in themselves, but it was the unauthorized use of the respondent’s title documents by the appellant to secure a loan from the bank that amounted to a case of concealed fraud. The Arowolo case is clearly distinguishable from this case, as the allegation of fraud as raised by the defendants in this case, is raised as a defence, and will not confer any remedy on any of the parties if the matter as presently constituted, proceeds to hearing, especially as this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain cases of fraud. Section 73(1) of the Abia State College of Technology Aba Law of 2009 will therefore apply in this case, and I so find and hold. I add very quickly that this does not mean that an allegation of fraud is not sustainable if raised ab initio by a party alleging fraud. In a ruling delivered on 8th October 2013 in the unreported case of Mrs. Folorunsho Victoria vs. Police Service Commission & 2 others NICN/IB/16/2012, Justice B.B. Kanyip held thus: “In any event, Rahamaniyya United (Nig.) Ltd v. Ministry for Federal Capital Territory & Ors. [2009] 43 WRN 124 CA at 145 at 146, applying Chigbu v. Tonimas (Nig.) Ltd [2006] 31 WRN 179; [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt. 986) 189 SC at 210, held that the propriety or otherwise of the act of the defendants is not a relevant consideration for the applicability of the Public Officers Protection Act. The case continued that if an action against a public officer or public institution and organization is statute-barred having not been brought within the prescribed period of three months, there will be no basis for investigating the conduct of the public officer which gave rise to the action. That the conduct of the defendant as to whether he was malicious or not is irrelevant in determining whether the cause of action is statute-barred under section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act, referring to Egbe v Adefarasin [2002] 14 WRN 57 and Aremo II v. Adekanye [2004] 42 WRN 1 SC.” I align myself wholly with the reasoning of my learned brother and I hold that the allegation of fraud or concealment of fraud as raised in the statement of defence is irrelevant in determining whether or not this action is statute barred. Therefore the statute of limitation (in this case Section 73 of the Abia State College of Health Technology Aba Law, 2009) will apply. The Supreme Court has held in the case of MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR OF EKITI STATE & ORS vs. ALADEYELU & ORS (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) 619 that: “It is from either or both the writ of summons and statement of claim that one can ascertain the alleged date when the wrong in question is said to have occurred or been committed, thereby giving rise to the plaintiff’s cause of action. When that ascertained date is compared with the date the writ of summons or originating process was filed in court, it can then be determined whether the action was instituted within the period allowed by law or outside it. When it is found that the action was instituted within the period allowed by law, the action is said to be competent and the court has the jurisdiction to entertain same but where it is found to have been instituted outside the period allowed by law, the action is said to be statute barred and consequently, the court is without jurisdiction to entertain same.” Per Onnoghen JSC. From the facts of this case, one would ask: “when did the cause of action arise” or better put, what event triggered this action. To the defendant, the cause of action arose in October 2010 when the Claimant noticed that he was neither being assigned any duties nor being paid any salary. This argument appears tenable, considering the fact that the accreditation exercise took place in October 2010, and after the exercise, the claimant was neither assigned any duties nor paid any salary. I therefore hold that the cause of action arose in October 2010. This action was filed on 27th June 2013, which is clearly outside the three months limitation period prescribed by Section 73 of the Abia State College of Health Technology Aba Law, 2009. It is noted that the claimant’s solicitor wrote two letters to the defendants, to which there was a reply dated 16th October 2012. Even if this court were to adopt a more liberal approach and hold that it was the said reply that finally made it clear to the claimant that a wrongful act had been done to him, thereby putting the date of accrual of the cause of action at 16th October 2012, and the action was filed on 27th July 2013, it is still clearly outside the three months limitation period prescribed by Section 73 of the Abia State College of Health Technology Aba Law, 2009. On the whole, the motion on notice of the 1st 3rd and 4th defendants filed on the 10th day of January 2014 hereby succeeds. Consequently, the suit is hereby struck out. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Presiding Judge