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The claimant took up a complaint dated and filed on 9th May 2011 against the defendants. On 20th October 2011, with leave of Court, the claimant amended his complaint and the accompanying statement of facts. The claimant is praying for – 1. The sum of N20,000,000 (Twenty Million Naira) only being special and general damages representing the arrears of his monthly salaries, severance allowance, leave transport grant and other emoluments/allowances as the Chairman of Akoko-Edo local Government Council, Edo State during the period of his suspension as Chairman of the Council by the Governor of Edo State from February 2010 to December 2010 respectively, the suspension having been declared unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect by the High Court of Justice of Edo State in Suit No. HIG/4/2010 between Chief J. A. Emasealu v. Comrade Adams Oshiomole & 9 ors delivered on the 17th day of February 2011. 2. 10% interest on the sum of N20,000,000 (Twenty Million Naira) only from February 2010 to February 2011 and thereafter 10% interest on the judgment sum from the date of judgment until the total judgment sum is fully and totally liquidated. 3. Cost of the suit. The particulars of special damages are – i) Basic Salary from February 2010 to December 2010 at N463,517.72 per month = N5,098,695.98. ii) Severance allowance as Chairman of Akoko-Edo Local government = N2,724,936.00. iii) Leave Transport Grant for 2010 = N90,831.20. Total of Special Damages = N7,914,462.98. The claimant also claimed N12,085,538.98 as general damages for mental agony, embarrassment and inconveniences suffered by the claimant as a result of the letter of suspension which was set aside by the High Court of Edo State. The total amount claimed as special and general damages came to N20,000,000 (Twenty Million Naira) only. Accompanying the amended complaint and the statement of facts are the list of witnesses to be called and list of documents to be relied upon together with copies of the said documents marked as Exhibits A – F. Also filed by the claimant is his witness statement on oath dated and filed on 31st August 2012. In reaction, the defendants entered their respective memorandum of appearance. The 2nd defendant’s is dated 13th December 2011 and filed pursuant to this Court’s order made on 2nd December 2011, while that of the 1st defendant is dated 2nd March 2012 and filed pursuant to the order of this Court made on 22nd February 2012. Each defendant also filed its statement of defence, list of witnesses to be called, and list of documents to be relied upon at the trial together with copies of the said documents. The 1st defendant counterclaimed against the claimant for the following reliefs – (1) A declaration by this Honourable Court that the appointment of Special Assistants by the claimant was illegal, wrongful, unlawful and unconstitutional. (2) A declaration by this Honourable Court that all the monies and benefits paid to the seven (7) Special Assistants by the claimant from the treasury, purse and/or revenue of the counterclaimant which the claimant tagged as non taxable monthly allowance is illegal, wrongful, unlawful and unconstitutional. (3) A declaration by this Honourable Court that it was wrongful, illegal, unlawful and unconstitutional for the claimant to have paid his Personal Assistant, Mr. Friday Ogbodo, monies and benefits from the treasury, purse and/or revenue of the counterclaimant which he tagged as non taxable monthly allowance when same emoluments were already monetized along with the emoluments and benefits paid to the claimant. (4) A mandatory order of this Honourable Court directing and compelling the claimant to reimburse and pay back to the treasury and purse of the counterclaimant a total sum of N8,000,000.00 (Eight Million Naira) only representing the cumulative sum which the claimant paid to his seven (7) Special Assistants and his Personal Assistant tagged as non taxable monthly allowance from the treasury, purse and revenue of the counterclaimant at the rate of N50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand naira) only monthly from June 2008 to January 2010. (5) An order of this Honourable Court for a ten percent (10%) interate (sic) rate per annum on the non taxable monthly allowance of N50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira) only so paid his seven (7) Special Assistants and his Personal Assistant by the claimant from the treasury, purse or revenue of the counterclaimant commencing from June 2008 all through to the commencement of this suit till judgment and final liquidation of the judgment debt. (6) General damages by the sum of N100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) only occasioning from the injury and loss visited on and suffered by the counterclaimant as a result of the claimant’s wrongful, unlawful, illegal and unconstitutional conduct. (7) Cost and expenses incidental to this action. The claimant reacted by filing a reply to the 1st defendant’s statement of defence dated 19th March 2012. The said process also included the claimant’s defence to counterclaim of the 1st defendant. The claimant also filed a reply to the 2nd defendant’s statement of defence vehemently denying the averments of the 2nd defendant therein and putting it to the strictest proof. The reply to the 2nd defendant’s statement of defence is dated 22nd December 2011. At the trial, the claimant testified on his own behalf as CW. Mr. Fatai Umoru, a legal officer attached to Akoko-Edo Local government of Edo State, testified for the 1st defendant; while Rev. Patrick Esamah, a public servant and Secretary of Edo State Local Government Service Commission testified for the 2nd defendant. At the close of trial, parties were asked to file and serve their respective written addresses as per Order 19 Rule 13 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Rules 2007 starting with the defendants. This they did. In the order filed, the 2nd defendant’s written address is dated 2nd July 2013 but filed on 4th July 2013, that of the claimant is dated and filed on 5th August 2013, and that of the 1st defendant’s written address is dated and filed on 8th October 2013. The 2nd defendant’s reply on points of law is dated 24th September 2013 but filed on 30th September 2013. The claimant’s reply on points of law is dated and filed on 21st October 2013. This slightly distorted order of filing written addresses was the product of the 1st defendant failing to file as and when due thus necessitating the claimant to file before it. The case of the claimant is that he was duly sworn in as the Chairman of Akoko Edo Local Government on 18th December 2007 for a period of 3 years from 18th December 2007 – 17th December 2010. That he diligently went about his duties and responsibilities until he was suspended from office as Chairman by the Governor of Edo State. He went on that he challenged his suspension at the High Court of Justice of Edo State, Igarra Judicial Division vide an originating summons dated 2nd March 2010 and based upon that the said suspension was declared null and void. That all through the period of his suspension, both the 1st and 2nd defendants refused to pay even half of his salary and other emoluments as stipulated under the relevant statutory Rules and Regulations. He thereafter wrote two letters both dated 1st March 2011 to the 1st defendant to which he received no response. His further case is that he was subjected to mental agony and embarrassment as a result of the suspension which was later set aside by the High Court of Edo State. The case of the 1st defendant is that it was not a party to the suit of the claimant wherein his suspension was declared null and void and that more so that there is a pending appeal at the Court of Appeal, Benin Division against the judgment of the Edo State High Court upon which the claimant is predicating his action. In addition, the defendant counterclaimed against the claimant that the claimant without the approval, confirmation and authorisation of the Legislative Council of the 1st defendant unilaterally, wrongfully, unlawfully and illegally appointed seven (7) persons as Special Assistants as his private and personal staff, even though there is no such provision for such offices in the Edo State Local Government Law 2000 (as amended). It is also the case of the 1st defendant that the claimant illegally, wrongly and unlawfully paid out monies to these seven (7) appointees from the treasury of the 1st defendant, even though no provision for such payment is provided in the Political and Public Officers Emolument Law 2007 of Edo State and there was no budgetary appropriation for such payment by the Legislative Council of the 1st defendant. Furthermore, that even though the salaries of the Personal Assistant to the claimant (Friday Ogbodo) was monetised by 15% of the basic annual salary of the claimant and same paid to the claimant, the claimant still proceeded to illegally, wrongfully and unlawfully pay a monthly sum of N50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira) as emolument to the same Personal Assistant of his. Lastly, that it may be pertinent to note that the 1st defendant’s averments to these facts and evidence led in proof of these facts was never controverted nor contradicted by the claimant. The 2nd defendant simply denied being jointly responsible for the payment of the claimant’s monthly salary, severance package, transport grant and all other emoluments/allowances as the Chairman of Akoko-Edo Local Government Council, Edo State having not employed the claimant in any capacity within the time in issue or at any other time. The 2nd defendant framed two issues for the determination of the Court, namely – 1. Whether the claimant (an elected Local Government Chairman) is a public servant of a State or a staff of the Local Government within the contemplation of section 318(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 2. Whether if issue 1 above is resolved in the negative, the 2nd defendant is under any statutory obligation to pay the claimant his monthly salaries, severance package, transport grant and all other emoluments/allowances as the Chairman of Akoko-Edo Local Government Council, Edo State. On issue 1, the 2nd defendant submitted that the claimant is not public servant of a State or a staff of the Local Government within the contemplation of section 318(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution since he was a political officer who was never at any time appointed or employed by the 2nd defendant, referring to Dada v. Adeyeye [2005] 6 NWLR (Pt. 920) 1 at 23 where the Court of Appeal held inter alia – "A Chairman of a Local Government Council is not a staff of the Local Government to bring him within the meaning of a public service of a State. This is because he is not appointed by the Local Government Service Commission of the State which is the body legally responsible for appointment of Local Government Council Staff. He is simply a political appointee though by election. His office is therefore not defined as being within the public service of the State as provided for under section 318(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution. The 2nd defendant submitted further that it is not every person who works in a Local Government Council that is a staff of the Local Government, also referring to Dada v. Adeyeye (supra) at page 9, Ratio 8 where the Court held thus – It is not every person who works in a Local Government Council that is a staff of the Local Government. To be a staff, one must be employed by the Local Government Service Commission of the State or under its delegated power. Also referred to the Court is Momoh v. Okewale [1977] 6 SC 81, where the Supreme Court held inter alia – ...to be entitled to be described as a public officer, a person must have been appointed to the office which he holds and in which he is serving by the Public Service Commission of the State concerned. In the instant case, that there is no evidence before the Court that the claimant was appointed or employed by the 2nd defendant (the Local Government Service Commission, Edo State) as a Council Chairman or in any other capacity at that time in question or at any other time. In fact, the claimant in his averments confirmed that he was elected the Chairman of Akoko-Edo Local Government and not an appointee or employee of the 2nd defendant. Finally on this issue, the 2nd defendant submitted that the claimant, being an elected Local Government Chairman, is not a public servant of a State or a staff of the Local Government, urging the Court to so hold and resolve this issue in favour of the 2nd defendant. Regarding issue 2, the 2nd defendant adopted its submission on issue 1 and submitted further that if issue 1 above is resolved to the effect that the claimant is not a public servant of a State or a staff or the Local Government within the contemplation of section 318(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution, then the 2nd defendant (the Local Government Service Commission, Edo State) will not be statutorily responsible for his appointment, monthly salaries, severance package, transport grant and all other emoluments/allowances. The 2nd defendant went on that statutorily the 2nd defendant is only responsible for the appointments, confirmations, discipline and remuneration, promotion, transfer and termination of members of staff who are civil servants in the Local Government of Edo State including Akoko-Edo Local Government where the claimant served as the Council Chairman. That there was no evidence on record that claimant has ever in the time past received his salary or any other allowance from the 2nd defendant or any of its delegated agents before his purported suspension from office in February 2010. Finally, and on the whole, the 2nd defendant submitted that it (the Local Government Service Commission, Edo State) is not statutorily responsible for the claimant’s monthly salary, severance package, transport grant and all other emoluments/allowances since the claimant is an elected Local Government Chairman who is not a public servant of a State or a staff of the Local Government, urging the Court to so hold and resolve the two issues in favour of the 2nd defendant. The claimant in reaction framed only one issue for the determination of the Court, namely – Whether having regard to the judgment of the Edo State High Court, Igarra, per Justice Ahiamojie dated 17h February 2011 the claimant is not entitled to the payment of his monthly salaries and other emoluments. The claimant then submitted that he is entitled to the payment of his monthly salaries and other emoluments as claimed in his reliefs. That the reasons for the above are not farfetched i.e. the claimant is a public servant and the fact that he was purportedly suspended does not disentitle him from receiving his salaries and allowances. The claimant referred to Longe v. FBN Plc [2010] 20 NLLR (Pt. 57) at 315 E – G where the Supreme Court decided on the meaning and effect of suspension of an employee as follows – In general sense, suspension of an employee from work only means the suspension of the employee from performance of the ordinary duties assigned to him by virtue of his office. That the Court went further at 315 G – H as follows – Suspension is not a demotion and does not entail a diminution of rank, office or position. Certainly, it cannot import a diminution of the rights of the employee given to him under the law.... The claimant’s point is that the fact that he was suspended does not remove or even reduce his right to be paid the arrears of his entitlements, benefits and emoluments. To the claimant, he was duly elected as the Chairman of the Akoko Edo Local Government (hereinafter referred to as local government) on 15th December 2007 under the auspices of the Peoples Democratic Party during the conduct of the Local Government election in Edo State. He was duly sworn in on 18th December 2007 for a period of 3 years to elapse on December 17, 2010, referring to Exhibit A i.e. the certificate of return which shows clearly the regularity of the election of Chief J. A. Emasealu as Chairman. The claimant herein upon assumption of office duly performed his duties and responsibilities without any official show of displeasure from the electorate or even the Edo State Government. However, on 17th February 2010 (referring to Exhibit B), the claimant was suspended with immediate effect from office by the Edo State Governor without following due process and consequent upon the suspension, the 1st and 2nd defendants refused to pay him his monthly salary and allowances from February 2010 till December 2010. The claimant challenged his suspension vide an originating summons at the High Court of Justice, Edo State and on the whole Justice E. O. Ahamioje on 17th February 2011 delivered judgment in the said suit and among other things held as follows – On the whole, and arising from the analysis aforesaid, this action succeeds only to the extent that the suspension of the Plaintiff by the 1st Defendant vide Exhibit 3 is null and void. The claimant referred the Court to Exhibit C and paragraph 10 of the amended statement of facts. That the judgment referred to above is the bedrock upon which this instant suit is predicated upon. This is so because having declared the purported suspension of the claimant null and void, the next reasonable step to be taken is to ensure that all salaries and benefits accruing to the claimant is paid to him by the defendants. That the question that readily comes to mind is: what is the proper channel and procedure to see to the payment of arrears of the claimant’s salary and emoluments? That the simple answer can be gleaned from the relevant provision of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Third Alteration Act) 2011 where section 254C(1) provides as follows – Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters – (k) relating to or connected with disputes arising from payment or non-payment of salaries, wages, pensions, gratuities, allowances, benefits and any other entitlement of any employee, worker, political or public office holder, judicial officer or any civil or public servant in any part of the Federal and matters incidental thereto. The claimant, therefore, submitted based on the above provision of the law that the sole question before the Court to determine is whether the claimant is entitled to the payment of his benefits, salaries and emoluments in view of the fact that the purported suspension of the claimant had before now been declared null and void by the Edo State High Court per Ahamioje J. Another issue, according to the claimant, that arises for determination here is whether he is one of the categories of persons envisaged under section 254C(1)(k) of the Third Alteration Act to qualify him to claim the reliefs sought as per his general form of complaint and paragraph 20 of his amended statement of facts. For clarity of argument, that the categories of persons who can claim are as follows – a. Employee b. Worker c. Political/public office holder d. Judicial officer e. Civil servant f. Public servant To the claimant, he belongs to the (f) category i.e. public servant, referring to the provisions of Exhibit F i.e. the Political and Public Officers Emolument Law 2007. Section 2 thereof provides as follows – There shall be paid such remuneration, salaries, allowances and benefits as are prescribed by this law, to the holders of offices referred to in the First Schedule. That a close look at the First Schedule of Exhibit F shows that Chairman is listed as Number 19, which goes to show that the Chairman of the local government i.e. the claimant herein is envisaged by law as part of those who are entitled to receive remuneration and wages under the First Schedule. The claimant also submitted that by virtue of section 4 thereof the claimant is an elected officer of the local government. The claimant continued that in his evidence in chief, he stated that he was not paid his salary for the period February 2010 – December 2010 and that he is entitled to same since he was suspended for no just cause. That the import of the judgment of the Edo State High Court is to the effect that the claimant was never suspended and hence should have been paid all his salaries and emoluments as and when due. That he also stated both in his evidence in chief and under cross-examination by the 2nd defendant’s counsel that after he got judgment at the High Court, he wrote letters of demand to the defendants as required by law to which he got no response. The claimant went on that under cross-examination, he also stated that the 2nd defendant was his employer and that salaries came from the allocation to the local government council. That on 10th May 2013, the 2nd defendant’s witness, Rev. Patrick Esamah, admitted under cross-examination that the 2nd defendant has the duty of ensuring the payment of salaries of staff appointed by the Local Government Service Commission under the Unified Local Government Service of the State applicable to all staff of all local government in Nigeria. To the claimant, the only time this Court will not grant payment of arrears of worker’s/employee’s allowances/wages is where the party claiming same does not show justification for same, referring to this Court decision in Concorde Hotels v. NUHPSW [2007] 9 NLLR (Pt. 23) at page 52. That based on this decision, the claimant has complied with all the requirements stipulated for the grant of his prayers. That documents have been tendered to show that the claimant is being owned the quantum of money stated and this will assist the Court in reaching a reasonable decision on this matter. The claimant continued that in view of the fact that the earlier Edo State High Court judgment per Justice E. O. Ahamioje had settled the preliminary issues between the parties herein, what is left is for this Court is to award the claims of the claimant as per paragraph 20 of his amended statement of facts. The claimant urged the Court to resolve this sole issue in his favour and, having regard to his submissions on the issue formulated, to hold that – i) The claimant is entitled to the arrears of his salaries, emoluments and benefits for the period between February 2010 and December 2010 together with interest accruing thereto. ii) The 1st defendant’s counterclaim is dismissed in its entirety as an afterthought and totally lacking in merit. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to discountenance the arguments of the defendants on the issue formulated above and any other such issue formulated by them as same is not only a callous attempt to perpetually deny the claimant of his lawful salaries, arrears, emoluments and allowances but also a calculated attempt to deceive this Court. The 2nd defendant reacted to the claimant’s written address by filing a reply on points of law. To the 2nd defendant, the claimant had argued the following issues – 1. That the claimant (an elected Chairman to Local Government Council) is a public servant of the State or a staff of the Local Government within the contemplation of section 318(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution. 2. That the claimant being a public servant of the State or a staff of the Local Government within the contemplation of section 318(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution, the 2nd defendant is under a statutory obligation to pay the claimant his monthly salaries, severance package, transport grant and all other emoluments/allowances as the appointed Secretary to Akoko-Edo Local Government Council, Edo State. In reply, the 2nd defendant adopted its submissions in its written address and submitted further that the claimant is not and was never a public servant of a State or a staff of the Local Government within the contemplation of section 318(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution since he was a political officer who was never at any time statutory appointed or employed by the 2nd defendant, referring to Nadabo v. Dubai [2011] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1245) 155 at 159 where the Court of Appeal (Kaduna Division) held inter alia – To be a Staff of a Local Government Council as envisaged by section 318(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution, a person must be employed by the Local Government Service Commission of the State. The 2nd defendant then submitted that a Chairman of a Local Government Council is not a staff of the Local Government as to bring him within the public service of a State, refer to Nadabo v. Dubai (supra) at 160, ratio 8 where the Court held as follows – A Chairman of a Local Government Council is not a staff of the Local Government as to bring him within the public service of a State. The reason is that his method of appointment is different from that of the members of staff of the Local Government. The 2nd defendant went on that the Local Service Commission as a body is only legally responsible for the appointments of the Local Government Council Staff and not a political office holder as in the case of the claimant. On the nature of office of a political office holder, the 2nd defendant referred to Orji v. Ugochukwu [2009]14 NWLR (Pt. 1161) 207 at 229 Ratio 10, where the Court held inter alia – …the 1st and 2nd Appellants were political office holders whose appointments, among others, serve at the pleasure of the Governor of Abia State and accordingly not persons in the public service of Abia State. Also considering the provision of Section 182(1)(g) read together with section 318(1) of 1999 Constitution, the term “public officer”, should only relate to holders of offices mentioned in section 318, being employees whose appointments enjoy statutory flavour because it is only those set of people who have conditions of service and/or letters of appointment stipulating how many years they are to spend in the service, at what age they should retire, the number of months to be given as notice either by the employer or the employee, to mention but a few conditions of service... Furthermore, that the onus and burden of proving or establishing the ingredients of the assertion that the claimant is or was in the public service of the Local Government of Akoko-Edo, is on the claimant by virtue of section 137(1) of the Evidence Act, referring to Orji v. Ugochukwu (supra) at 324 Ratio 8. Finally, and on the whole, the 2nd defendant submitted that it (the Local Government Service Commission, Edo State) is not statutorily responsible for the claimant’s monthly salaries, severance package, transport grant and all other emoluments/allowances since the claimant is not a public servant of a State or a staff of the Local Government but political appointee at the pleasure of Local Government Chairman. The 2nd defendant then urged the Court to so hold and resolve the two issues earlier raised and argued in favour of the 2nci defendant. The 1st defendant on its part framed two issues for the determination of the Court, namely – 1) Whether or not, on the strength of evidence adduced side by side with the position of the law, the claimant has sufficiently made out a claim supported by the position of the law that entitles him to the grant of his claims as contained in his amended complaint and amended statement of facts against the defendants and more particularly the 1st defendant. 2) Whether or not the 1st defendant has made out a successful counterclaim against the claimant to warrant the grant of its counterclaim against the claimant. And if in the affirmative, whether the counterclaimant cannot set off the judgment sum against whatever is found due to the claimant in his original claim. In arguing issue 1), the 1st defendant submitted that the claimant is not entitled to the grant of the claims or any of the claims contained in his amended complaint and amended statement of claim due to the under mentioned grounds – (a) Lack and absence of foundational claim/relief sought upon which the claim for arrears of salaries and severance benefit is anchored or predicated. (b) The action of the claimant is statute-barred and more so the 1st defendant was not a party sued by the claimant in the judgment entered by the Edo State High Court. (c) Lack of proof of special damages by the claimant. (d) There is no express agreement between the parties on interest and neither is the claim of interest under custom of dealings by the parties. (e) Lack of pleading and/or evidence adduced for claim of interest. Concerning the first ground of its objection, the 1st defendant’s submission is that it is trite law that a party cannot be granted by the Court reliefs or claims which he did not specifically claim or prayed for. That the Court cannot go out of its own to award what is not claimed or a relief not specifically claimed by the claimant, citing VeePee Ind Ltd v. Cocoa Ind. Ltd [2008] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1105) 406 at 512 and Okeowa v. Migliore [1979] 11 SC 138. That flowing from this settled position of the law, a party who relies on wrongful and unlawful stoppage and/or cessation of his salaries and emolument must specifically make or seek the Court’s declaration to this effect as his relief(s) and/or claim(s) before the Court can so grant and or make a finding to that effect. A party is bound by his claims or reliefs sought before the Court. That the Court cannot on its own without invocation of the plaintiff reach a finding that the plaintiff’s salaries and emoluments were wrongly stopped or that a wrong of whatsoever has been visited on him. Any attempt to do this will amount to the Court descending into the arena of dispute and taking sides with one of the combatants. That the Court cannot on its own formulate issue or claim for a litigant. For the Court to consider the claim for arrears of salaries and benefits as claimed by the claimant must flow from the question or claim submitted for the Court to decide or adjudicate upon. That here must be an invitation or invocation by way of a claim or relief before the Court can reach this finding, referring to Juwo v. Shehu [1992] 8 NWLR (Pt. 258) 129 and Agharuka v. FBN Ltd [2010] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1182) 465 484. In the circumstances, it is the 1st defendant’s submission that in the absence of specific claim and or relief sought for unlawful/wrongful stoppage, salaries and severance benefit, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider any averment in the pleadings and or reach a finding that had to do or connected with unlawful and or wrongful stoppage of the claimant’s salaries and severance benefits. It is the further submission of the 1st defendant that the claimant ought to specifically claim and/or make a relief sought in the claims and fully supported by averments in the pleadings. That failure to so do this deprives this Court the requisite jurisdiction to consider the averments that touch on same. In essence, that those paragraphs of the pleadings which are not supported or stand on the reliefs/claims sought by the claimant are at variance with the claims sought and, therefore, liable to be struck out and evidence given thereon goes to no issue. To this extent that the Court should strike out and discountenance paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 19(e) of the amended statement of fact and all the evidence led thereon, referring to Oshiomhole v. Aarihiavhere [2013] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1353) 376. As a corollary from the above submission, the 1st defendant submitted that in the absence or by the failure of the claimant to make or seek the relief or claim of unlawful or wrongful stoppage of his salary and/or emoluments before this Court, he has by the default not imposed a legal duty or demand on the 1st defendant to defend a non-existent claim or relief not claimed or made against it as this will amount to changing our adversarial system of adjudication to inquisitorial and same amounts to springing surprise or ambushing the 1st defendant. That it is settled principle of law that pleaded facts must have a nexus with the claims/reliefs sought before the Court, referring to Oshiomhole v. Aarihiavhere (supra) and Ojiogu v. Ojiogu [2010] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 431. Further to this, it is the 1st defendant’s submission that the issue of whether the claimant should be paid his salaries and emoluments by the 1st defendant or whether the payment of his salaries and emoluments was wrongly or illegally stopped by the 1st defendant was never an issue submitted for the Court’s adjudication in Suit No: HIG/4/2010 between Chief J. A. Emasealu v. Comrade Adams Oshiomhole & 9 ors. On this premise, that even though this issue of salaries and emoluments was never before the Edo High Court and same never pronounced upon, the 1st defendant was never a party to that suit and consequently cannot be bound by the outcome of the judgment of that suit. That it is a well-established principle of law that orders/judgments of Court are binding only on adjudicating parties that are before the Court, citing Kokoro-Owo v. Lagos State [2001] 1 NWLR (Pt. 773) 237, Nwazurike v. AG of the Fed [2013] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1361),Uku v. Okumagba [1974] 1 All NLR 475 and Usung v. Nyong [2010] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1117) 83. The 1st defendant continued that the claimant woefully failed to discharge the onus of proof expected of him to succeed in his claim for special damages. The non-pleading of sufficient facts and lack of evidence in proof of the specific claim of special damages by the claimant is fatal to his case. That the only averment regarding the emolument of the claimant is contained in paragraphs 16 and 17 in the amended statement of facts and the only evidence led in proof of this fact is contained in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the claimant’s written statement on oath and also the Political & Public Officers Emolument Law 2007 of Edo State. That outside of the aforesaid paragraphs and law which did not however specifically show that the claimant was indeed earning the specific monthly sum as salaries and other emoluments claimed by him, no further evidence was put before this Court by the claimant. It is the 1st defendant’s submission that outside the fact that the law so provide for such sums to be paid to the claimant, the claimant has a legal duty to proof before Court that he was indeed earning this specific sum prior to when the payment was stopped by the 1st defendant. Such proof could be by the claimant tendering in evidence payment slips, payment voucher, statement of his salary account, etc. That this, the claimant has not done. To the 1st defendant, the claimant did not even positively plead or lead evidence to the fact that he was actually receiving or actually received these specific sums before the payments were stopped but what he claimed, pleaded and led evidence is that he is merely entitled to the sums. That this cannot ground or sustain a claim under special damages. That the claimant’s claim for special damages is not damages simpliciter, but monies he alleges that is due to him which the 1st defendant has not paid and by this, the claimant has the onerous legal duty to show and prove before this Court that the 1st defendant had been paying him these specific sums before it was stopped, referring to Edun v. Provost LACOED [1998] 13 NWLR (Pt. 580) 52, SPDC Nig. Ltd v. Tiebo VII [1996] 4 NWLR (Pt. 445) 657 and Immana v. Robinson [1979] 3 & 4 SC 1 at 23. That this positron of lack of the discharge of burden of proof and its debilitating effect on the claimant’s case is brought to fore by decision reached by the Supreme Court in the case of UBN v. Ozigi [1994] 3 NWLR (Pt. 330) 392 and Nigerian Maritime Services Ltd v. Afolabi [1978] 2 SC 79 at 84. The 1st defendant then urged the Court to reach a finding that the claimant has not supported his claim with strict and credible evidence of actual earnings of the claimant from the 1st defendant and as a result, he has woefully failed to discharge the burden of proof incumbent on him so as to warrant or shift the onus unto the 1st defendant to adduce evidence to disprove. That it is trite law that where a plaintiff as in the instant case fails to prove the base upon which he founded his title, the claim must fail and consequently, where a plaintiff just like the claimant in this case, has failed to discharge the burden which lies on him for proving his case, then the proper judgment will be for the defendant, referring to Madumere v. Okafor [1990] 3 NWLR 330 and Odofin v. Ayoola [1984] 11 SC 72. The 1st defendant went on that that in the absence of invocation of the Court by the claimant that a wrong or injury had been occasioned on him through the stoppage of his salaries and emoluments by the 1st defendant, the claimant cannot successfully make a claim for general damages. This is because it is settled principle of law that damages flow from a wrong or injury caused on the plaintiff by a defendant. The Latin word is ubi jus ubi remedun. It, therefore, follows that where no wrong is found by the Court or where the Court has not been invited to find out if a wrong has been done to the plaintiff; such a claim for general damages cannot be considered and/or granted by the Court as a claim for general damages cannot be made in vacuum. It must flow from a wrong or injury suffered by the plaintiff, even though cannot be measured in monetary exactitude. Outside this, that the claimant has not adduced any iota of evidence how he suffered mental agony, intimidation and embarrassment as a result of the non-payment of his salaries and emoluments by the 1st defendant. Instead, the evidence led by the claimant before this Court as contained in paragraph 19 of his written statement on oath is to the effect that the claimant “was subjected to mental agony, intimidation and embarrassment as a result of my suspension from office as the Chairman of the Local government, the suspension which the High Court of Edo State later set aside”. This piece of evidence, according to the 1st defendant, has no bearing whatsoever on the 1st defendant since the 1st defendant was not a party nor alleged to be instrumental or instigated the suspension of the claimant from office and also was not a party to the suit setting aside the said suspension of the claimant. Also, that whatever shock, trauma, mental agony and embarrassment of whatsoever suffered by the claimant resulting from a letter of suspension not alleged to have been written, authored, transmitted and/or delivered to the claimant by the 1st defendant cannot ground or sustain a claim of damages on the 1st defendant. Lastly, coming to the claim for prejudgment interest as claimed by the claimant, the1st defendant submitted that as a general rule interest is not payable on a debt or loan in the absence of express agreement by the parties or some course of dealing or mercantile practice or custom to that effect. That interest is not even payable on contract for work done for which payment is in arrears. That in the instant case where the claimant’s claim for interest is not premised on any rationale, such a claim cannot be entertained by this Court as it amounts to gold-digging, referring to P. P. Madus Ltd v. Roads Nig. Ltd [2011] 2 NWLR (Pt. 230) 88 at 100 – 101. Even at that, it is the 1st defendant’s submission that a plaintiff seeking a pre-judgment interest must as a matter of necessity and legal duty plead and lead evidence to prove same. In this instant case, that no iota of averment either in the claimant’s pleadings or shred of evidence is led on the claim of interest by the plaintiff. In the circumstance, that this Court has no option but to decline the award of interest to the claimant, referring to Berliet Nig. Ltd v. Kachalla [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 420) 512. That even in circumstances where the plaintiff makes a claim of interest as of right, outside the plaintiff specifically indorsing the claim in the writ of summons, he must as a duty plead the facts which show and how he is entitled to the interest in the statement of claim and go ahead to lead evidence in proof thereof. That the failure of the claimant to even do this at all is incurably fatal to his case and the claim should be thrown into the dust bin, citing Texaco Overseas Nig. Unltd v. Pedmar [2002] 13 NWLR (Pt. 785) 526. As to proof of the 1st defendant’s counterclaim against the claimant, the 1st defendant submitted that the counterclaimant has sufficiently proved and established its case to merit the judgment entered in his favour. In proof of this, that the counterclaimant pleaded and led evidence to the fact that the appointments of the seven (7) Special Assistants was not just unilaterally done by the claimant without the approval, confirmation or authorisation of the 1st defendant’s Legislative Council, the Governor of the State, the 2nd defendant or the House of Assembly of the State, monies paid or caused to be paid to them by the claimant was never provided for by the Political & Public Officers Emolument Law 2007 of Edo State and coupled with the fact that these seven positions of Special Assistants are not provided for or created by the Edo State Local Government Law 2000 (as amended) and more so, when the appointive powers of the claimant are not absolute. That these facts were eloquently pleaded in paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 of the 1st defendant’s statement of defence which was subsequently adopted to be part and parcel of the counterclaim and also paragraphs 2 and 3 of the counterclaim. That evidence was also led to prove these facts in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14 of the 1st defendant’s witness written statement on oath which was admitted as evidence before this Court. Also, that the 1st defendant pleaded in paragraph 7 of the statement of defence, which was subsequently adopted to be part and parcel of the counterclaim and also paragraph 1 of the counterclaim and led evidence in paragraph 12 of the 1st defendant’s witness written statement on oath to the effect that even though the salaries of the Personal Assistants were monetised by 15% of the claimant’s annual salary and same paid to him, the claimant still went ahead to wrongfully, illegally and unlawfully pay a monthly sum of N50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira) from the treasury and purse of the 1st defendant from June 2008 to January 2010. That these sacred facts and evidence were never rebutted, contradicted and/or controverted by the claimant. Instead, the claimant copiously admitted the counterclaimant’s averments. To this extent, that even though the appointive powers of the claimant are not absolute but subject to the approval, ratification and confirmation of the 1st defendant’s Legislative Council, such appointments must however be into specific offices created and provided by the Edo State Local Government Law 2000 (as amended) and salaries and emoluments can also equally be paid only for such specific offices provided for by the Political & Public Officers Emolument Law 2007 of Edo State. The 1st defendant then referred to sections 21, 22(2) and section 23 of the Edo State Local Government Law 2000 (as amended), as well as to the Political & Public Officers Emolument Law 2007 of Edo State where no provision of Special Assistant is made. It is the 1st defendant’s submission and it is trite law that the enumeration of office in a statute or law goes to confirm that the inclusion of that office signifies the exclusion of any other office that is not specifically mentioned or listed, citing Orji v. PDP [2009] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1161) 310 at 391 and Dada v. Adeyeye [2005] 6 NWLR (Pt. 920) 1. That it therefore follows that if the appointment of the Special Assistants is not valid and same wrongful, illegal and unlawful and more so when the consent, authorisation, approval and confirmation of the 1st defendant’s Legislative Council was not sought and or obtained by the claimant before the said unilateral appointment, the consequences is that monies so paid to the Special Assistants from the treasury and purse of the 1st defendant was wrongfully, unlawfully and illegally paid and same renders the claimant liable. The 1st defendant continued that it is trite law that where a Director or Chairman of a company takes a decision or action on behalf of a company without the knowledge of other Directors, he cannot absolve himself from liability which arises from that action, citing PAISC Ltd v. Jkpeez Impex Co. Ltd [2010] 3 NWLR (Pt 1182) 441 at 463. That this Court should hold the claimant liable for the monies wrongfully, unlawfully, illegally and unconstitutionally paid from the treasury, revenue and purse of the counterclaimant to the claimant’s seven (7) Special Assistants and one (1) Personal Assistant. As to damages claimed by the counterclaimant resulting and occasioning on it from the wrongful, unlawful and illegal conduct of the claimant, the 1st defendant submitted that this claim is merited by the counterclaimant and the counterclaimant has accordingly established same to have flowed as a consequence of the claimant’s conduct. That these facts were eloquently pleaded and evidence led upon by the counterclaimant in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the counterclaim and paragraphs 14, 15, 24, 25 and 26 of the counterclaimant’s written statement on oath which is in evidence before the Court. Once again, that it is instructive to note that these copious averments as to the hardship, loss and deprivation of finances caused on the counterclaimant through the conduct of the claimant were never controverted, denied or challenged by the claimant. In the circumstance and in the face of credible and sufficient evidence adduced relating to the injury and wrong visited on the 1st defendant by the claimant which however was not rebutted or denied by the claimant, that the Court is left with no option than to enter judgment as per the counterclaim in favour of the 1st defendant. That it is trite law that where facts are admitted, then there is no need to further proof, citing section 123 of the Evidence Act 2011 and Nwuke v. UBN Plc [2009] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1148) 28. As regard the claim for interest, the 1st defendant abandoned that leg of its counterclaim for pre-judgment interest and accordingly urged the Court to grant it ten percent (10%) interest rate per annum on the judgment sum to be entered in favour of the 1st defendant by this Court commencing from when judgment is so enterer or delivered until the final liquidation of the judgment debt by the claimant. In conclusion, the 1st defendant urged the Court to dismiss the claimant’s action with substantial cost as the suit is frivolous, gold-digging, unmeritorious, speculative and lacking in bona fide. In reaction to the 1st defendant’s final written address, the claimant submitted that it is not correct that he did not make any foundational claim/relief upon which his claim for salary and severance benefits is anchored or predicated. The claim then reproduced the particulars of his claims as earlier reproduced at the start of this judgment. To the claimant, the 1st defendant’s absence in Suit No: HIG/4/210 (Chief Emasealu v. Comrade Adams Oshiomole & ors) does not affect the validity of the suit and by his presence in the present suit, he is bound by the decision of this Court. That the defendants were and are responsible for the payment of the claimant’s salary and this is why his letter of 3rd March 2011 captioned, “PAYMENT OF EMOLUMENTS”, was addressed to the 1st defendant. That the claimant’s salaries right from the time of his assumption of office to when he was suspended had always come from the defendants. The claimant continued that section 68(1) of the Edo State Local Government Law 2000 (as amended) empowers the Chairman to appoint a Secretary for the Council, which goes to show that the then Chairman acted on the authority bestowed on him by the statute which is the instrument of the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant cannot now turn around to shy away from the consequences and responsibilities stemming from the statute. Burdens and benefits go hand in hand. It is the claimant’s submission that he is at liberty to pursue his remedy or claims against the defendants as he so deserves. That he is not to be forced to sue a person against whom he alleges no wrong, citing Okesade v. Ogunkayode [1994] 1 NWLR (Pt. 318) 26 at 36 – 37 CA, Akanni v. Olaniyan [2006] 8 NWLR (Pt. 983) 531 at 546 C – E and Onibudo v. Abdullahi [1991] 2 NWLR (Pt. 172) 230 at 245 and 251. That assuming without conceding that this Court finds that the then Chairman is a necessary party in this suit, this will still not warrant a striking out of this suit, citing Sapo v. Sunmonu [2010] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1205) 374 SC particularly at 400 A – C and Ayorinde v. Oni [2000] 3 NWLR (Pt. 649) 348 at 361 G – H, Oladeinde & anor v. Oduwole [1962] 10 NLR 41, Uku & ors v. Okemagba & ors [1974] 3 SC.35 and Peenok v. Hotel Presidential Ltd [1982] 12 SC 1 at 48. The claimant then submitted that he has legal capacity to bring this action, the defendant has the capacity to defend same and that there is a cause of action against the defendants. That this suit has equally satisfied all pre-conditions for instituting this action. As a matter of emphasis, that this suit has survived several preliminary objections raised by the 1st defendant. On the issue of non-disclosure of cause of action against the 1st defendant, the claimant contended that in his witness statement on oath, he established that his appointment was truncated as a result of his suspension by the Governor of Edo State which has now been nullified by the judgement of the Edo State High Court. For the definition of cause of action, the claimant cited Sulgrane Holdings Inc. v. FGN [2012] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) at 333 – 334, Anukwu v. Eze [2012] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1310) 50 CA, A.G. Fed v. Abacha [2010] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1221) 1 and Sani v. President, FRN [2010] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1198) 153. To the claimant, it is glaring from the face of the complaint, statement of facts and witness statement on oath that there is an enforceable claim against the 1st defendant herein as there are relevant facts and circumstances contained therein. Regarding interest/special damages, the claimant contended that he is at liberty to claim interest on the judgment sum. That the issue of a previous agreement between parties as to interest on a judgment sum as proffered by learned counsel to the 1st defendant is rather strange and ridiculous. The claimant went on that he has been subjected to undue hardship by the suspension, referring to Mrs. Abdulrahman Yetunde Mariam v. University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital Management Board unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/359/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on 19th June 2013. On the 1st defendant’s argument that the claimant failed to discharge the onus of proof expected of him in relation to special damages, the claimant referred to Uman v. Owoeye [2003] 9 NWLR (Pt. 825) 221 at 238 – 239 D – A, where it was held as follows – Special damages must in the circumstance be claimed specially and strictly proved. The court is not entitled to make its own estimate of the same. It does not mean that the law requires an extra ordinary measure of evidence to establish entitlement to special damages. Strict proof of special damages means that the evidence must show particularly and while basing his claim upon a precise calculation must give the defendant access to the fats which make such calculations possible. That the above requirement of the law was complied with by the claimant as can be gleaned from paragraph 20(i), (ii) and (iii) of the amended statement of facts in terms of basic salary, severance allowance and leave transport grant for 2010. The claimant also referred to FBN Plc v. Associated Motors Co. Ltd [1998] 10 NWLR (Pt. 570) 441, FBN Plc v. Abba [1998] 10 NWLR (Pt. 569) 227, Salako v. Williams [1998] 11 NWLR (Pt. 574) 505, Adeola v. Oloba [1998] 9 NWLR (Pt. 545) 224, Ngilari v. Mothercat Ltd [1999] 13 NWLR (Pt. 636) 626 and Okoronkwo v. Chukweke [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt.216) 175. The claimant went on that he has further pleaded his schedule of salary as provided for in the Political and Public Officers Emolument Law 2007 of Edo State in paragraph F of the amended list of documents to be relied upon. The claimant then urged the Court to discountenance the misconceived argument of the 1st defendant that the claimant did not plead special damages in its entirety. On the 1st defendant’s contention that the claimant has refused to adduce any iota of evidence that he suffered mental agony, intimidation and embarrassment as a result of the non-payment of his salaries and emoluments such as to warrant general damages, the claimant submitted that he suffered untold hardship since his suspension which has become indefinite. That a worker is entitled to his wages, referring to Akinkugbe v. E. H. (Nig.) Ltd [2008] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1098) 375 at 390 – 391 H – A and Gari v. Sarafina (Nig) Ltd [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1070) 1 at 19 A – B. The claimant continued that he has inevitably suffered some mental agony and financial hardship which came to him naturally as a result of his suspension, citing Osuji v. Isiocha [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 623 at 636 C – D and Odulaja v. Haddad [1973] 11 SC 357 at 360. To the claimant, general damages consist of all items of loss which the claimant is not required to specify in his pleading in order to allow him recover monetary compensation in respect of them at the trial. Furthermore, that general damages is inferred or presumed by the Court, a fortiori it will be general for the purpose of pleading since what the law is prepared to infer or presume in the claimant’s favour the defendant cannot contend would surprise him at the trial. With respect to the claim for prejudgment interest, the 1st defendant had contended that the claimant did not plead prejudgment interest. He also referred to P. P Madus Ltd v. Roads Nig. Ltd [2011] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1230) 88 at 100. In answer, the claimant stated that the case cited by the 1st defendant is not on all fours with the instant case. That in the case cited, the Court refused to grant the prejudgment interest on the ground that the claimant did not plead prejudgment interest. However, that this is not the same position with the case at hand, wherein the claimant had pleaded in his complaint and in paragraph 20(b) of it amended statement of fact. The claimant urged the Court to disregard the contention for lack of merit. The 1st defendant further claimed that the claimant did not lead evidence with respect to the claim of interest. In answer, the claimant referred to paragraph 20 of his witness statement on oath, which contains the facts as to the claim for interest, and which was adopted and admitted by the claimant during trial. That same serves as evidence before the Court. The claimant then drew the Court’s attention to the fact that the 1st defendant’s counsel was absent without adducing any reason on the day slated for trial in this matter and, therefore, foreclosed from cross-examining the witness called by the claimant, citing Eresia-Eke v. Orikoha [2010] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1197) 421 at 448 and Amadi v. Nwosu [1992] 5 NWLR (Pt. 241) 273 at 284 SC and Adesule v. Mayowa [2011] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1263) 135 at 181 where it was held that the effect of failure to cross-examine a witness on a particular matter is a tacit admission of the truth of the evidence of the witness not cross-examined. The claimant then urged the Court to hold that the claimant’s evidence stands uncontroverted by the 1st defendant. On the 1st defendant’s assertion that the claimant appointed seven (7) Special Assistants without confirmation or authorization of the 1st defendant’s Legislative Council, Governor of the State, the 2nd defendant or the House of Assembly, the claimant responded that the claimant has the right to appoint Special Assistants as provided in the Schedule to the Political and Public Officer Emolument Law 2007 of Edo State. Secondly, that the Special Assistants have being serving and performing their duties with Local Government without any complaint from the 1st and 2nd defendants, until the suspension of their appointment and are, therefore, estopped from denying their appointment, referring to A. G. Nasarawa State v. A. G. Plateau State [2012] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1309) 419 at 449 E – F. The claimant went on that the 1st defendant’s assertion in paragraphs 4.28 – 4.29 of its final written address goes to no issue as they are unfounded. That counsel to the 1st defendant merely stated that it is the responsibility of the claimant to pay the salaries of his Special Assistants and Supervisors from his own salary without backing same with legal authorities or statutory provisions under the Edo State Local Government Law. The claimant then urged the Court to discountenance the 1st defendant’s counterclaim wherein the sum of N108,000,000.00 was claimed against the claimant. That counsel to 1st defendant went further to argue that the positions of Supervisors, Special Advisers and Personal Assistants are not provided for in the Edo State Local Government Law 2000 (as amended). The claimant referred to the First Schedule to the Political and Public Officers Emolument Law 2007, particularly items 24, 25 and 26, which make provision for the Secretary to the Local Government, Supervisor of Local Government and Special Adviser to Local Government, respectively. The claimant continued that his action in appointing Assistants and Supervisors was not carried out in his personal capacity or independent of the 1st and 2nd defendants, referring to Dada v. Adeyeye [2005] 6 NWLR (Pt. 920) 1, where the Court held that – It is not every person who works in the Local government that is a Staff of the Local government. To be a staff, one must be employed by the Local Government Service Commission of the State or under its delegated power” (emphasis is the claimant’s). That going by the statement of Rev. Patrick Esamah, the Chairman of the Local Government Council only makes recommendation to the Legislative Council of the 2nd defendant, but that the 2nd defendant approves. That the said “Legislative Council” is a delegate of the Service Commission (the 2nd defendant); and by approving the appointments made by the claimant, it acted under a delegated power of the Commission. To the claimant, the word “staff” has been defined in the New International Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language: DELUXE ENCYCLOPEDIC EDITION (page 1219) as – A body of persons associated in carrying out some special enterprise under the supervision of a manager or chief. In further response to the 1st defendant’s misconceived and misguided contention, the claimant contended that vide paragraphs 1 to 4 of his defence to the 1st defendant’s counterclaim, he debunked in toto and seriatim that no illegal or unconstitutional monies were paid to any Personal Assistant or Special Assistant(s) rightly appointed by him. That the claimant further led evidence on this issue which was not challenged or controverted in any form whatsoever by the 1st defendant during trial. The claimant then submitted that the issue of setoff does not in any way arise in the instant case. On the issue of statute-barred raised by the 1st defendant’s counsel in paragraph 4.01 of his final written address, the claimant contended that this issue was laid to rest in the Court’s ruling of 27th July 2012. In that ruling, the Court affirmed that this suit is not statute-barred. It is, therefore, the claimant’s argument that this Court cannot sit on appeal over its own ruling having dismissed the 1st defendant’s preliminary objection in that regard. The claimant went on to distinguish cases cited. That “the claimant” cited the case of Immana v. Robinson [1979] 3 & 4 SC 1 at 23. On the principle for award of damage, that apart from being specifically pleaded, it must also be supported by credible evidence. That this case cited is not on all fours with the instant suit, as the case cited is with respect to the sale of property, while the case before the Court is simply claims for arrears of salaries, entitlements, emoluments, allowances and severance package. Secondly, that the claimant pleaded special damages and general damages in its amended statement of facts and witness statement on oath, which the claimant adopted during trial. That “the claimant” also cited the case of Nwuke v. UBN Plc [2009] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1148) at 28 to the extent that when a defendant admits facts in dispute by his pleading, that fact is deemed established and admitted. Also that which is admitted or not disputed need not be proved. To the claimant, the case is not on all fours with the case before the Court because the case cited by “the claimant” has to do with claim for service rendered by a Legal Practitioner whereas the case before this Court is simply claims for arrears of salaries, entitlements, emoluments, allowances and packages. That further to the 1st defendant’s statement of defence, the claimant argued that the Personal Assistants referred to in the 1st defendant’s statement of defence worked diligently for the Local Government and that they were not personal or domestic staff of the claimant but political appointees of the Local Government who performed their designated functions for the advancement of the Local Government. That the claimant also contends that the remuneration of the Personal Assistants cannot be tied to the salary of the claimant as the Personal Assistants were political appointees. The claimant continued that P. P. Madus Ltd V. Roads Nig. Ltd [2011] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1230) 88 at 100 – 101 cited by the 1st defendant is not on all fours with the instant case. That in the above case cited, the Court refused to grant the prejudgment interest on the ground that the claimant did not plead prejudgment interest. However, that this is not the same position with the instant case, in which the claimant has pleaded in his complaint and in paragraph 20(b) of his amended statement of fact. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to discountenance the arguments canvassed by the 1st defendant for lack of merit and ultimately grant the claimant’s reliefs as sought as per his complaint and statement of facts. I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes in the matter. In considering the merits of the case, I need to clarity a thing or two especially regarding the submissions made in this case. First, I must express the profound displeasure of the Court towards Prince H. I. O. Oshomah, counsel to the 1st defendant, who as counsel to the 1st defendant in the instant case as well as the sister cases to this case such as Hon. Peter Ekun & ors v. Akoko-Edo Local Government, Edo State & anor unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/34/2011 the ruling of which was delivered on July 9, 2013, never ceased to be very annoying in bringing up issues that have long been settled, issues that only the appellate process can resolve. Instead of awaiting that appellate process (that is if at all he even utilized it) he continually and annoyingly brings them up at all stages that he is asked to address the Court. His conduct to say the very least has been very unprofessional and I really wonder why all this while the disciplinary arm of the Bar is yet to catch up with him in his brand of legal practice. His lot give the Bar a very bad name. In paragraph 4.01 of his written address he stated in ground (2) that the present action of the claimant in the instant case is statute-barred. In the instant case (Chief J. A. Emasealu v. Akoko-Edo Local Government, Edo State & anor unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/31/2011), Prince Oshomah had earlier raised a preliminary objection that this case is statute-barred. In a considered ruling delivered on July 27, 2012 this Court held that the case is not statute-barred. Why is Prince Oshomah raising the issue again in his written address? Is he sufficiently not schooled enough to know that he cannot re-litigate that issue once a judicial pronouncement on it has been made? What kind of legal training did he have not to know that he can only raise that issue on appeal and not before this Court again? In Hon. Peter Ekun & ors v. Akoko-Edo Local Government, Edo State & anor, this is what this Court said of Prince Oshomah when he raised the issue of statute-barred even when the decision of July 27, 2012 in the instant case (Chief J. A. Emasealu v. Akoko-Edo Local Government, Edo State & anor unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/31/2011) was held to abide the sister case of Hon. Peter Ekun & ors v. Akoko-Edo Local Government, Edo State & anor – In fact in the submissions of Prince Oshomah in his written address, he never failed to rub it on the Court that the cause of action in this case arose in February 2010. See for instance paragraphs 4.19 and 5.01 of the written address. Even if Prince Oshomah is on appeal regarding the decision in Chief J. A. Emasealu v. Akoko-Edo Local Government, Edo State & anor, he ought to know that the decision of a court remains valid until it is actually upturned on appeal. For him to pretend that that decision of this Court does not exist or that it is different from the instant case and so cannot apply smacks of unprofessional conduct on his part. Worse still, he has the temerity to use the phrase “without conceding” to preface his objection. For a ruling delivered after arguments were canvassed with Prince Oshomah heard on the merit, for counsel to turn around and say that he does not concede to it leaves me to question whether it is open to counsel to challenge the ruling of a court in that manner. Even if there is a valid challenge as by filing an appeal, good professional conduct demands that counsel would disclose to the Court the fact of the existing appeal over it. For counsel to think that he can at this stage imply a disagreement of a valid and subsisting ruling of the Court is not only unprofessional but is a very bad example of advocacy which this Court will not, under any circumstance, condone. In that regard, let this be a caution to counsel. Despite this caution, Prince Oshomah has the shameless nerve, the audacity, the effrontery, the impudence and the temerity to raise the issue once again. His stance is contemptuous of the Court; and with this sort of practice, Prince Oshomah should be heading towards a disciplinary inquiry by the Bar. In the second place, counsel to the claimant wrote a letter dated 1st April 2014 with Ref. No. OO/LIT/LAG/0087/04/14 and addressed to the Registrar of this Court wherein the claimant’s counsel forwarded to the Court documents in support of the claimant’s case, documents sought for by one Philip T. Braimoh Esq. on behalf of the claimant after the close of addresses and adjournment for judgment. The defendants were copied. Quite rightly, counsel to the 1st defendant replied expressing shock at this form of advocacy. I share the very strong reservations of the 1st defendant on this issue and so would discountenance the documents sought to be tendered outside of the trial period and with no leave of Court even sought. In the third place, the claimant in his submissions had asked: what is the proper channel and procedure to see to the payment of arrears of the claimant’s salary and emoluments? And submitted that the answer lies in section 254C(1)(k) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. Here the claimant assumes that section 254C(1)(k) is a justifying and authorising provision to the right to salaries and allowances. Section 254C(1)(k) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, only grants jurisdiction on this Court over claims to salaries and allowances. It is not the provision that grants the entitlement to salaries and allowances as the claimant seems to argue. To be entitled to the salary and allowances claimed, the claimant must do more than just cite section 254C(1)(k) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. In the fourth place, the claimant, in paragraph 4.06 of his written address of 5th August 2013, had also argued that the 1st defendant, given his absence from Court on 21st November 2012, was foreclosed from cross-examining the claimant; and that the 1st defendant’s witness statement on oath was also not adopted before this Court, thus presupposing that the claimant’s evidence before the Court is uncontroverted by the 1st defendant, referring to Eresia-Eke v. Orikoha [2010] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1197) 421 at 448 where the Court held that “where a party fails to cross-examine a witness in respect of any part of evidence of such witness, such a party is deemed to have admitted and accepted the truth of such evidence”. Also referred to the Court are Amadi v. Nwosu [1992] 5 NWLR (Pt. 241) 273 and Adesule v. Mayowa [2011] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1263) 135 at 181, which held that “the effect of failure to cross-examine a witness on a particular matter is a tacit admission of the truth of the evidence of the witness not cross-examined”. The assertion that the 1st defendant’s witness statement on oath was also not adopted before this Court is wrong as from the records, Fatai Umoru, who testified for the 1st defendant adopted his sworn deposition on 5th February 2013 when he testified. In the fifth place, on its part, the 2nd defendant had submitted, in concluding its reply on points of law, that it “(the Local Government Service Commission, Edo State), is not statutorily responsible for the claimant’s monthly salaries, severance package, transport grant and all other emoluments/allowances since the claimant is not a public Servant of a State or a staff of the Local Government but political appointee at the pleasure of Local Government Chairman”. What does the 2nd defendant mean when it concluded that it is not statutorily responsible for the claimant’s remuneration since the claimant (who was Chairman of Akoko-Edo Local Government Council) is not a public servant but a political appointee at the pleasure of the Local Government Chairman? The claimant was Chairman of a Local Government. Is his own appointment as political appointee at his own pleasure? The claimant in paragraph 6.01 of his written address of 21st October 2013 had also added to the confusion when he asserted that – Assuming without conceding that it was the then Chairman, Mr. J. A Emasealu, who singlehandedly and without consultation to the Commission appointed the claimant, how then do we describe the action of Mr. J.A Emasealu? He can be best described and conceived as someone who was merely carrying out a delegated power or exercise. He is an officer of the Council and government at large and he would be seen as acting in that capacity. In the sixth place, the claimant in paragraph 5.01 of his written address of 21st October 2013 had argued that he suffered undue hardship by his suspension and then referred to Mrs. Abdulrahman Yetunde Mariam v. University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital Management Board unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/359/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on 19th June 2013 where this Court held that “an employee should not be kept under suspension indefinitely without initiating and concluding disciplinary proceedings against him as this puts him under undue hardship and makes it impossible for him to seek some other employment”. The claimant is not re-litigating the issue of his suspension – that already litigated at the High Court. So I do not see the relevance of Mrs. Abdulrahman Yetunde Mariam v. University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital Management Board here. If that decision is used as authority for the proposition that this Court kicked against indefinite suspension, it must be understood that it was in the context of the necessity for disciplinary hearing to be conducted and concluded on time. The argument of the claimant in paragraph 5.06 that his suspension has become indefinite cannot even be tenable as his suspension could not have gone beyond his term of office, which as he stated himself, was December 2010. These clarifications made, I now turn to the merit of the case of the claimant. The argument of the claimant is that he was elected as Chairman of Akoko-Edo Local Government for a term of three years. He was then suspended and so not allowed to run his full term of three years. He got a favourable judgment from the High Court that his suspension was null and void. That since his suspension, he was not paid his salary and allowances for the period February 2010 to December 2010, a period he should have served out the balance of his term of office as Chairman. In proof of his salary and allowances, he deposed in paragraphs 14 and 18 of his sworn deposition that his salary and allowances are drivable from Part II of the Second Schedule to the Political and Public Officers Emolument Law 2007 of Edo State; and that for the period February 2010 to December 2010, he was not paid his salary and allowances. The Political and Public Officers Emolument Law 2007 of Edo State is a piece of legislation that this Court is enjoined to take judicial notice of and under which the claimant is claiming. The claimant, to my mind, has accordingly made out his case. Instead of adducing evidence to the Court that the claimant has been paid his salary and allowances, the 1st defendant in paragraph 4.06 of its written address is saying that this “Court should strike out and discountenance paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 19(e) of the amended statement of fact and all the evidence led thereon”. This defence is lame and not sustainable, and is accordingly rejected. The 1st defendant further argued that even though the issue of salary and emoluments was never before the Edo High Court in Suit No: HIG/4/2010 between Chief J. A. Emasealu v. Comrade Adams Oshiomhole & 9 ors and same never pronounced upon, the 1st defendant was never a party to that suit and consequently cannot be bound by the outcome of the judgment of that suit. The point is that if the High Court of Edo State had made any pronouncement on the issue of salary and allowances in the suit that came before it, or if the 1st defendant had been a party to it, the present suit would have been unnecessary. Instead of answering to the claims of the claimant, the 1st defendant prefers the escapist route of saying that it was not a party to the Edo State High Court case. Whether it was not a party in that suit or not, the issue presently being considered is whether it has a duty to pay the salary and allowances of the claimant for the period February 2010 to December 2010. In any event, who were even the defendants in Suit No. HIG/4/2010? The defendants were: Comrade Adams Oshiomole as Governor of Edo State, the Attorney-General of Edo State, Edo State House of Assembly, the Honourable Commissioner for Local Government & Chieftaincy Affairs, the Local Government Service Commission of Edo State, barr. Akinola Agbaje as Vice Chairman of Akoko-Edo Local Government Council, Hon. Justice Momodu Raje (Rtd) as Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry into Tenure of Hon. Johnson Emasealu as Chairman of Akoko-Edo Local Government Council, Mr. E. T. Idahosa as Secretary of the Commission of Inquiry, Theresa Itebimei Elemson (Mrs.) as Member of the Commission of Inquiry and S. O. Uvigue as Member of the Commission of Inquiry. With this array of defendants representing the Edo State Government of which the 1st defendant is part, how can the 1st defendant by any stretch of imagination be arguing that it is not bound by the Edo State High Court judgment in Suit No. HIG/4/2010? I think that the 1st defendant for lacking any credible argument against the claims of the claimant is resorting to technicality and is accordingly taking that technicality thing too far. The 1st defendant would go on to argue that in the absence or by the failure of the claimant to make or seek the relief or claim of unlawful or wrongful stoppage of his salary and/or emoluments before this Court, he has by the default not imposed a legal duty or demand on the 1st defendant to defend a non-existent claim or relief not claimed or made against it as this will amount to changing our adversarial system of adjudication to inquisitorial and same amounts to springing surprise or ambushing the 1st defendant. By this submission, I do not think that the 1st defendant itself understands the claim of the claimant. The claimant is not claiming for unlawful or wrongful stoppage of his salary and allowances for if the Edo State High Court had held that his suspension and removal from office was lawful the present suit would have been unnecessary. The claimant is simply claiming for his salary and allowances for the unexpired period of his tenure as Chairman. A defendant cannot substitute its own thinking as to a claimant’s case with its own. A defendant is to answer to the claims of the claimant as presented. The 1st defendant did not appear to understand this simple truth; instead it is talking about a non-existent claim or relief and the change of our adversarial system of adjudication to an inquisitorial one. The 1st defendant argued further that outside of paragraphs 16 and 17 of the amended statement of facts and the only evidence led in proof of this fact contained in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the claimant’s written statement on oath and also the Political & Public Officers Emolument Law 2007 of Edo State, which did not however specifically show that the claimant was indeed earning the specific monthly sum as salaries and other emoluments claimed by him, no further evidence was put before this Court by the claimant. Is the 1st defendant saying that one piece of evidence may not be enough to sway a decision in that regard? In other words, is the 1st defendant arguing that it is the number of the pieces of evidence that determines whether a claim succeeds or not? In Omonua v. Okpere [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 189) 36, Onowhosa v. Odiuzou [1999] 1 NWLR (Pt. 586) 173, Mogaji v. Odofin [1978] 4 SC 91 at 94 and Agih v. Ejunkeonye & Bros Ltd [1992] 3 NWLR (Pt. 228) 200, it was held that it is not the quantity but the quality of evidence that matters in a case. And where a statute such as the Political and Public Officers Emolument Law 2007 of Edo State imposes a duty to pay and the sum to pay, what other proof is the 1st defendant looking for to establish that duty to pay? All that the claimant is required here is to show that he comes within the ambit of the law and has satisfied all the requirements of the law entitling him to the payment under the law. The defendants are not saying that the claimant was not elected Chairman of Akoko-Edo Local Government Council, they are not saying that his tenure was not to run through the period February 2010 to December 2010 and they are not saying that his suspension and removal from office has not been pronounced upon favourably by the Edo State High Court. All that the defendants are saying is that the obligation to pay is not theirs. They then further hinged their defence on one technical reason or the other. There is sufficient evidence before the Court that the claimant was elected and was to serve as Chairman of Akoko-Edo Local Government Council for three years from 18th December 2007 – 17th December 2010, and that he was suspended, removed and denied the opportunity to serve out his full term of office. I am satisfied that the claimant has made out his case for the payment to him under the Political & Public Officers Emolument Law 2007 of Edo State his salary and allowances for the period February 2010 to December 2010. The 2nd defendant had raised a two-prone defence: that it is not responsible for the payment of the claimant’s salary and allowances as it is not the body that appointed the claimant; and the instant action is premature given that the issues in Suit No. HIG/4/2010, which form the basis of the claims of the claimant, are yet to be resolved in an appeal pending at the Court of Appeal. As it is, the first reasoning begs the issue. The case of the claimant is that he was elected, not appointed, as Chairman of the 1st defendant. That the 2nd defendant would raise the argument that because it did not appoint the claimant it cannot be responsible for the payment of his salary raises the question who would be responsible for the payment of the salaries and allowances of the President of the country and Governors of the States as elected officers. The argument of the 2nd defendant seems to suggest that only an appointive authority would be responsible for the salary of a claimant; and because it did not appoint the claimant, it should not be held responsible. I do not see any sense in this argument. The logical conclusion of the argument is that elected officers would have no paymasters since they are not appointed but elected. I accordingly reject the argument of the 2nd defendant in that regard. The second strand of the 2nd defendant’s argument (also referred to by the 1st defendant) is that this action is premature given that the issues in Suit No. HIG/4/2010, which form the basis of the claims of the claimant, are yet to be resolved in an appeal pending at the Court of Appeal. First the notice of appeal frontloaded by both the 1st and the 2nd defendants bears no appeal number. So I am not sure whether there is a valid pending appeal. Secondly, it is trite learning that a judgment of a Court, until actually set aside by a higher Court, remains valid and binding. The judgment of the High Court in Suit No. HIG/4/2010 has not been shown to this Court to be set aside. It accordingly remains valid and binding; and I so find and hold. In all, I do not see merit in any of the submissions of the 2nd defendant – they are accordingly discountenanced for purposes of this judgment. What then are the actual claims of the claimant? I indicated earlier that there is sufficient evidence before the Court that the claimant was elected and was to serve as Chairman of Akoko-Edo Local Government Council for three years from 18th December 2007 – 17th December 2010, and that he was suspended, removed and denied the opportunity to serve out his full term of office. I also indicated that I am satisfied that the claimant has made out his case for the payment to him under the Political & Public Officers Emolument Law 2007 of Edo State his salary and allowances for the period February 2010 to December 2010. By College of Education, Ekiadolor v. Osayande [2010] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1191) 423, where a contract of service is for a fixed term, the employee cannot be removed during the period of the term contracted, except for misconduct or where the employee dies; and where the contract is determined before the expiration of the term agreed, the employer shall be made to pay the employee the full salary he would have earned for the period of his fixed contracted term. And in Shena Security Co. Ltd v. Afropak (Nig.) Ltd [2008] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 77, it was held that in a pre-determined term of service, the employee cannot be removed during the period of the term contracted for; and where the employer determines the contract before the expiration of the term agreed, the employer shall be made to pay the full salary the employee would have earned for the unexpired period of his fixed contractual term. This means that the claimant is entitled to be paid the full salary he would have earned for the unexpired period of his tenure as Chairman i.e. the period February 2010 to 17th December 2010. In evidence, the claimant disclosed his monthly salary to be N463,517.72. For the period February 2010 to November 2010, the salary will come to a total of N4,635,177.20. The claimant’s tenure was to expire on 17th December 2010. This means that he is only entitled to payment up to that date, not for the whole of December 2010. When N463,517.72 is divided by the 31 days in December, what we have per day is approximately N14,952.18. This sum multiplied by the 17 days of December 2010 will give us approximately N254,187.14. N4,635,177.20 plus N254,187.14 gives us a total sum of N4,889,364.34, as salary for the period February 2010 to 17th December 2010 due to the claimant; not N5,098,695.98 as claimed by the claimant. I accordingly find and hold that the claimant’s entitlement to salary for the unexpired period of his term of his tenure due to him from the defendants is N4,889,364.34 only. In addition to this, the claimant is entitled under the Political & Public Officers Emolument Law 2007 of Edo State to his severance allowance, which is N2,724,936.00 and his leave transport grant for 2010, which is N90,831.20. In total, the claimant is accordingly entitled to N7,705,131.54; and I so find and hold. I am satisfied that in claiming for salary and allowances, the claimant met the particularization demanded of him (contrary to the argument of the 1st defendant) by the Supreme Court in University of Jos v. Dr M. C. Ikegwuoha [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 478. The Supreme Court had cautioned that a claim for salary, allowances and the like without any particularisation as to how the sum was earned and arrived at makes such a claim vague; and courts are enjoined not to grant same. In the instant case, the claimant satisfied the requirement of particularisation in terms of how the sums were earned and arrived at; and I so find and hold. The claimant also claimed N12,085,538.98 as general damages for mental agony, embarrassment and inconveniences suffered by the claimant as a result of the letter of suspension which was set aside by the High Court of Edo State. I agree with the defendants that the claimant did not make a case for the payment of this head of claim. It accordingly fails and so is dismissed. The claimant claimed for both pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on the sums he claimed. This Court does not grant pre-judgment interest. See Kurt Severinsen v. Emerging Markets Telecommunication Services Limited [2012] 27 NLLR (Pt. 78) 374, Miss Ebere Ukoji v. Standard Alliance Life Assurance Co. Ltd unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/48/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on March 26, 2014 and Miss Odiete Hope Ogaga v. Jopa Energy Ltd unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/408/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on March 26, 2014. However, by Order 21 Rule 4 of the NIC Rules 2007, this Court at the time of delivering judgment or making an order may direct the time within which payment of a judgment sum is to be made or other act is to be done and may order interest at a rate not less than 10% per annum to be paid upon any judgment. I now turn to the counterclaim of the 1st defendant, which is that the claimant made seven appointments into the offices of Special Assistants and Personal Assistant when he had no authority to do so; and that he should accordingly be ordered to pay back into the coffers of the counterclaimant (1st defendant). In support, copies of the appointment letters of the seven personnel were frontloaded. A look at these appointment letters will show that they are all dated 26th March 2008. This action was filed on 9th May 2011. Between 26th March 2008 and 9th May 2011, the 1st defendant did not see it as a wrong that the claimant made appointments when he had no authority to do so. If the appointments the claimant made were really made without authority why did the 1st defendant wait this long, and only by way of a counterclaim, to complain? I do not think the 1st defendant is serious. I agree with the claimant that the 1st defendant is estopped from raising this issue. Accordingly, I find no merit in the counterclaim of the 1st defendant. It is, therefore, dismissed. On the whole, and for the avoidance of doubt, I hereby order as follows – 1. The defendants shall pay to the claimant the sum of Seven Million, Seven Hundred and Five Thousand, One Hundred and Thirty-One Naira, Fifty-Four kobo (N7,705,131.54) only being the full salary, severance allowance and leave transport grant he would have earned for the unexpired period (i.e. the period February 2010 to 17th December 2010) of his tenure as Chairman of Akoko-Edo Local Government Council. 2. The said sum of N7,705,131.54 shall be paid within 30 days of this judgment; failing which it shall attract interest at the rate of 10% per annum until liquidated Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip