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The claimants had commenced this action vide a complaint dated 3rd day of August 2012 praying for the following reliefs – 1. A declaration that the contract of employment dated 4th May 2011 between the claimant and defendant was determined by the defendant on the 15th of May 2012. 2. A declaration that the defendant is bound by all the terms contained and agreed to in the contract of employment dated 15th May 2012. 3. An order of this Honourable Court directing the defendant to pay the claimant the sum of N1,741,666.7 (One Million, Seven Hundred And Forty-One Thousand, Six Hundred and Sixty-Six Naira, Seven Kobo) representing the claimant’s salaries for June and July 2012. 4. An order of this Honourable Court directing the defendant to pay the claimant the sum of N1,741,666.7 (One Million, Seven Hundred and Forty-One Thousand, Six Hundred And Sixty-Six Naira, Seven Kobo) representing payment in lieu of notice for the month of August and September 2012. 5. An order of this Honourable Court directing the defendant to pay the claimant the sum of N2,000,000 (Two million Naira only) being payment for medical expenses and damages and trauma occasioned as a result of injury sustained in course of carrying out his duties at T’Chad. 6. An order of this Honourable Court directing the defendant to pay the claimant the sum of N550,000 (Five Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira only) being refund of the 5% that was illegally deducted every month from the claimant’s salaries throughout the period of my employment with no reasonable explanation or documentation. 7. Cost of this action. Accompanying the complaint are the statement of fact, statement on oath of the claimant, list of witnesses, list of documents and copies of the documents to be relied upon at the trial. The defendant entered appearance, refuted the claims of the claimant and in fact counterclaimed against the claimant by filing a statement of defence/counterclaim and defendant’s witness statement on oath on 20th September 2012. Also filed by the defendant is the list of witnesses, list of two documents to be relied upon at the trial and copies of the two documents. The counterclaim of the defendant is for – (i) The return of the defendant’s Kia Cerato Car with Registration No. LT 986 EKY. (ii) The sum of N50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira) per day and N250,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) per week from 4th July 2012 until the car is returned to the defendant being the cost of hiring alternative vehicle for another manager for his job. (iii) The sum of N250,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) being the cost of wear and tear occasioned on the car by the illegal usage of the vehicle since 4th July 2012. (iv) The sum of N100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Naira) for the Mobile phones given to the claimant by the defendant for carrying out his duties which he has refused to hand over to the company. (v) The sum of N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) as General Damages for the illegal detention of the said vehicle. The claimant thereafter filed a reply and defence to the counterclaim dated 29th October 2012 but filed on 13th November 2012; and which was deemed properly filed on 11th June 2013. Also filed by the claimant is an additional deposition on oath dated 13th November 2012, additional list of documents and copies of the additional documents. The case went on trial on December 19, 2012 and the parties called witnesses at the trial. The claimant testified on his own behalf as CW, while Rotimi Alade, the Company Secretary of the defendant company, testified on behalf of the defendant as DW. At the close of trial, parties filed and served their written addresses starting with the defendant in accordance with Order 19 Rule 13 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Rules 2007. The defendant’s written address is dated 8th November 2013, while that of the claimant is dated 27th January 2014. The defendant did not file any reply on points of law. The case of the claimant is that he was employed by the defendant to create a viable market in the west coast region of Africa for the defendant’s products (referring to paragraph 4 of the defendant’s witness deposition on oath) on a 12-month renewable fixed term contract starting from 4th July 2011. That he worked hard to establish viable markets for the products in T’Chad, Benin, Cameroon, Senegal, Gambia and Guinea. The claimant continued that while carrying on his duties for the defendant on 15th May 2012, he was involved in an accident and had his leg badly damaged so much that he had to undergo surgical operations on the affected leg, yet the defendant ignored this unfortunate incident and the need to take care of the claimant even after due report to the management of the defendant. The claimant nonetheless continued working dedicatedly for the defendant afterwards and this resulted in unprecedented growth and sales in the business of the defendant (referring to paragraphs 3, 6, 8 and 9 of the claimant’s reply and defence to counterclaim). The claimant stated instances where he had challenges in creating viable markets in respect of which he wrote reports to his line head (referring to paragraph 4 of claimant’s reply and defence to counterclaim). To the claimant, it is worthy of note that throughout the employment period of the claimant until the defendant stopped paying the claimant’s salary, 5% of the claimant’s salary was always illegally deducted. That on 15th June 2012, his line manager, Mr. Aris Kokkinis summoned him and informed him that the defendant had terminated his employment and that he should immediately hand over all the defendant’s assets in his possession to one Mr. Bamidele who is a Director with the defendant. The claimant however protested such an inglorious approach to edge him out of an organization he had laboured immensely to contribute to its growth. The defendant stopped paying the claimant’s salary immediately. The claimant however still continued in the employment of the defendant until 19th July 2012 and as at “18th July 2008”, Mr. Aris Kokkinis, the claimant’s line manager precisely instructed the claimant to prepare a letter of gratitude to one Al-Bashir. When the claimant’s salaries were further withheld, the claimant approached the Director of Human Resources of the defendant who confirmed that his employment had been terminated and could only be paid salary for “June and July 2008”. On 3rd August 2012, the claimant then filed this suit and on 23rd August 2012 (over 3 weeks after this suit has been filed) the defendant through its solicitors wrote a letter making a demand for the claimant’s official car. The case of the defendant is that it entered into a renewable fixed term contract of employment with the claimant but that the renewal of the contract was subject to good performance on the part of the claimant hence it was not made for long duration (referring to Exhibit D1) to be able to observe the performance of the claimant. However, that in this case the performance of the claimant was below expectation. That it came out during cross-examination that for a contract of 12 months, the claimant did not make any return until the 8th – 9th month of the contract, always giving one excuse or the other yet collecting his salary every month. The defendant continued that it being a profit oriented organization had to mitigate its loss by hiring Consultants to generate sales in many of the countries that the claimant was sent to before they were able to make the little sales they made; hence it could not continue to retain the claimant while still incurring further expenses to generate sales. That prudence demands that his contract cannot be renewed. That the claimant’s allegation that his appointment was summarily terminated by Mr. Aris Kokkinis on 15th June 2012 cannot be true as he was not employed by the said Mr. Aris Kokkinis. That the claimant was employed by the defendant, his appointment was in writing and he can only be terminated by the defendant in writing as provided for in Exhibit D1 and C1. Similarly, that Mr. Aris Kokkinis was just an employee just as the claimant was and Kokkinis was just his line Manager to whom he was reporting to and takes instruction from but does not have the ostensible authority to sack him. To the defendant, what transpired on 15th June was that Mr. Aris Kokkinis gave the claimant instruction to start preparing his hand over note as he (Mr. Kokkinis) was proceeding on annual leave the following day, and will not be around when the claimant’s contract expires on 3rd July 2012. That it is the policy of the company to which he agreed to abide with on page 2 of Exhibit D1 and C1 that whenever an employee is leaving the employment he or she needed to complete the exit formalities, after which his salaries and entitlements will be calculated and paid to him, which the claimant in this case stubbornly refused to do in clear breach of the 2nd page of the agreement he signed with the defendant. Similarly, that upon the expiration of his contract he refused to hand over the car and phones of the defendant that were given to him to aid his movement and work. That the claimant still held onto them even up till the time of the defendant’s written address in spite of the fact that they were not part of his claim before the Court, a fact the claimant agreed with under cross-examination, yet he held onto them depriving the defendant of the use of same even when no more contract existed between him and the defendant. The defendant went on that it wrote to him on Exhibit D2 for him to return the properties of the defendant and in spite of his receipt of the letter he still failed, refused and/or neglected to release the goods to the defendant prompting the defendant to counterclaim for the goods and the loss of use of same and damages from the claimant in this action. The defendant framed three issues for the determination of the Court, namely – (a) Whether or not there had been a breach of contract by the defendant of any of provisions of Exhibit D1 and C1 and if not whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs claimed except that of his salary for June and July which the defendant conceded to. (b) Whether the defendant is not entitled to all reliefs claimed in its counterclaim having regard to the admission under cross-examination that he is detaining the goods while not being part of his claim before the Court. (c) Whether Exhibits C4, C8, C9 and C10 (being computer generated evidence) are admissible in evidence and similarly whether Exhibit C11 being a document made in a foreign language is equally admissible in evidence and if not whether same ought not to be expunged. On issue (a), the defendant submitted that a contract may be defined as a legally binding agreement between two or more persons by which rights are acquired by one party in return for acts or forbearances on the part of the other, citing Orient Bank (Nig) Plc v. Bilante Int’l Ltd [1997] 8 NWLR (Pt. 315) 37 at 41. That there are five important factors that must be present in a valid contract. These are offer, acceptance, consideration, intention to create legal relationship, and capacity to contract. All the five ingredients must be present before a valid contract can exist in law, referring to Okubule v. Oyagbola [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 147) 723. Similarly, that in order to create a binding contract, the parties must express their agreement in a form which is sufficiently certain for the courts to enforce. And a court of law must always respect the sanctity of the agreements reached by parties; it must not make a contract for them or re-write the one they have already made for themselves, citing SE Co. Ltd v. NBCI [2006] 7 NWLR (Pt. 978) 201; [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 316) 255. The defendant then submitted that the contract of the parties in the instant suit is as contained in Exhibit D1 or C1. That the said Exhibit is very clear and unambiguous as to its duration which is for a fixed term of one year, but renewable subject to good performance which unfortunately is not the position in this case. That it is trite law that in the construction of the terms of a contract the meaning to be placed on it is that which is the plain, clear and obvious result of the term used. A contract or document is to be construed in its ordinary meaning as question of fact. Thus where the words of a contract agreement or document are clear, the operative words in it should be given their simple and ordinary grammatical meaning, citing Dalek (Nig) Ltd v. OMPADEC [2007] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1033) 402. The defendant also submitted that Exhibit D1was clear enough on its face as to the duration of the contract and since the claimant was not given any letter terminating the contract before its expiration on 3rd July 2012, then there had been no breach of the terms of Exhibit D1 by the defendant hence no reasonable cause of action had been established against the defendant, referring to UTC (Nig) Plc v. MIB Ltd [2003] 13 NWLR (Pt. 837) 291. The defendant went on that the allegation that the claimant’s reporting manager terminated his contract has no foundation as the said manager has no ostensible authority to do so, neither has the claimant shown or tendered in evidence any letter of termination by the defendant as he did the letter of appointment (Exhibit C1 and D1). Therefore, in the absence of such evidence, that it is safe to conclude that there was no termination of his appointment before his due date of extinction on 3/7/12. That what the claimant was asked to do on 15/6/2012 (which was just 2 weeks to the expiration of the contract) was to start preparing his handover note preparatory to his leaving as it is the policy of the defendant to which he already agreed to comply with in Exhibit D1 or C1. That all employees leaving the defendant’s employment must give disengagement report consequent upon which terminal benefits will be calculated; and that is why the defendant conceded the claim for his salary for June and July which was not paid due to his refusal to submit his handover or disengagement note, and upon which necessary calculations could be premised. The defendant continued that this is contrary to what the claimant signed for at the second page of Exhibit D1 wherein he promised to abide with all company policies which in essence had by law been expressly incorporated into the contract as decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Comptoir Comm & Ind. Ltd v. OGSWC [2002] 9 NWLR (Pt. 773) 629; [2002] FWLR (Pt. 105) 839 SC where it was held that – When a contract is reduced to the form of a document into which has been incorporated other documents, the documents so incorporated ceases to be extrinsic to the main document, but are to be construed as part of it and therefore become admissible. The defendant then submitted that the claimant was enjoined and duty bound to comply with the simple instruction of preparing a disengagement note to the defendant preparatory to the effluxion of his contract which he refused, failed and or neglected to do even up till now, thus if there had been any breach of the contract between the claimant and the defendant it is the claimant that had breached same to which the defendant is entitled to be damnified in damages as claimed in the counterclaim. The defendant went on that having debunked the notion that there was any breach of contract by the defendant, the necessary corollary is to look at his heads of claim and see whether same can be granted or not. As regards claim 1 i.e. “a declaration that the contract of employment dated 4/5/2011 between the claimant and defendant was determined by the defendant on 15th of May 2012”, the defendant submitted that as it had argued, relying on UTC (Nig) Plc v. MIA Ltd (supra), no such termination took place on 15/6/2012, urging the Court to dismiss the said claim. As to claim 2 i.e. “a declaration that the defendant is bound by all the terms contained and agreed to in the contract of employment dated 15/5/2012”, the defendant argued that it is ad idem with the claimant on this as that is the whole essence of the principle of sanctity of contract. As for claim 3 i.e. “an order of this Honourable Court directing the defendant to pay the claimant the sum of N1,741.666.7 (One Million, Seven Hundred and Forty-One Thousand, Six Hundred and Sixty-Six Naira, Seven Kobo) representing the claimant’s salaries for June and July 2012”, the defendant submitted that it had already agreed to pay the claimant his dues under the contract subject to his return of the defendant’s properties in respect of which there is a counterclaim in this suit. On claim 4 i.e. “an order of this Honourable Court directing the defendant to pay to the claimant the sum of N1,741.666.7 (One Million, Seven Hundred and Forty-One Thousand, Six Hundred and Sixty-Six Naira, Seven Kobo) representing payment in lieu of notice for the month of August and September 2012”, the defendant submitted that it has been established in evidence that there was no termination of contract by the defendant hence this claim becomes gratuitous and, therefore, cannot be granted and same should be dismissed. Regarding claim 5 i.e. “an order of this Honourable Court directing the defendant to pay the claimant the sum of N2,000,000 (Two million Naira Only) being payment for medical expenses and damages and trauma occasioned as a result of injury sustained in the course of carrying out his duties at T’Chad”, the defendant submitted that the claimant is merely gold digging in respect of same in that he admitted under cross-examination that he was not entitled to medical allowance because it has been built into his total emolument in the contract, hence there is no basis for claiming same and since it was not part of what was envisaged and agreed to in the contract it becomes extrinsic and definitely ungrantable, relying on Union Beverages Ltd v. Owolabi [1988] 1 NWLR (Pt. 68) 128 at 136, where it was held per Nnaameka Agu, JSC that – Liability in the law of contract is limited to legal obligations created by mutual agreement between the contracting parties and so does not admit of enforcement of gratuitous promises. On claim 6 i.e. “an order of this Honourable Court directing the defendant to pay the claimant the sum of N550,000 (Five Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira Only) being refund of the 5% that was illegally deducted every month from the claimant’s salaries throughout the period of my employment with no reasonable explanation or documentation”, the defendant submitted that paragraph 2 of Exhibit D1 and C1 has clearly stated that his salary is subject to deduction of applicable tax to which he agreed. That the claimant making this claim shows that the claimant has no regard for concluded agreement. The defendant further submitted that the claimant himself agreed under cross-examination that he is expected to pay deductible taxes hence his claim in this respect is frivolous and same be thrown out. Regarding claim 7 i.e. “cost of this action”, the defendant submitted that the claimant is not entitled to cost as his claim before the Court is to say the least very frivolous and embarrassing and, therefore, cost ought in fact to be awarded against him. Finally, the defendant submitted that the claims of the claimant ought to be dismissed except the claim for salary for June and July which defendant agreed to pay subject to his returning the defendant’s properties with him and whatever is adjudged against him in the counterclaim. On issue (c), the defendant submitted that Exhibits C4, C8, C9 and C10, being computer generated documents, are not admissible in evidence having regard to section 84(4) which requires a certificate stating the requirements in subsections (4)(a) – (c) and (5)(a) – (c). Similarly, that section 12(2)(b) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 enjoins this Court to be bound by the Evidence Act. Therefore, that the above Exhibits having not complied with the cited section of the Evidence Act ought to be expunged from the evidence before this Court. In the same vein, that Exhibit C11, which was made in a foreign language should not be admitted as evidence before this Court without any interpretation of same as English is the language of this Court and the said document not being in the language of this Court ought to be expunged from evidence, referring to Giwa v. Yarbum [2011] All FWLR (Pt. 565) 254 at 276 Ratio 14 D – E and Isaac Olubodun Akereja v. Chief Daniel Awodele Oloba [1986] 2 NWLR (Pt. 22) 251. Regarding the counterclaim which is issue (b), the defendant submitted that the claimant had admitted the claim of the defendant under cross-examination that he did not return the car and the phones with him when he was leaving and that in spite of the defendant writing him through their counsel in Exhibit D2 he still stubbornly and arrogantly held on to the properties to the detriment of the defendant who had to source for money again to hire vehicle for its workers so as not to disrupt its business. That the claimant has not either through oral or documentary evidence challenged the claim of the defendant hence same ought to succeed. The defendant went on that whilst the burden of proof of damages for breach of contract is on the plaintiff where his evidence is unchallenged, the burden of proof is discharged upon a minimum of proof, referring to Steyer (Nig) Ltd v. Gadzama [1995] 7 NWLR (Pt. 407) 305 at 311 – 312 and Medical and dental Council of Nigeria v. System Information Limited [1998] 12 NWLR (Pt. 577) 258 at 260 – 261. Finally, the defendant submitted that in awarding damages in an action founded on breach of contract, the rule to be applied is restitution in integrum, that is, in so far as the damages are not too remote the plaintiff shall be restored, as far as money can do it, to the position in which he would have been if the breach had not occurred, citing Okongwu v. NNPC [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt. 115) 296. That based on the above, the counterclaim of the defendant should succeed. In conclusion, the defendant submitted that the case of the claimant is not supported by law. Therefore, it is frivolous and does not disclose any reasonable cause of action and so should be dismissed, while the counterclaim, which had been admitted under cross-examination, and not being challenged in anyway, ought to be granted in its entirety. In reacting to the defendant’s written address, the claimant in his written address adopted the three issues framed by the defendant and stated that he will where necessary paraphrase and address them accordingly. On issue (a), the claimant contended that it is the case of the parties that Exhibit C1 or D1 embodies the contract of the parties. In effect the said exhibit does not only represent the wish of the parties (defendant more particularly) but its contents acquired a binding force on the parties from the day it was agreed to by a consensus ad idem of the parties, citing Orient Bank (Nig) Plc v. Bilante Int’l Ltd [1997] NWLR (Pt. 315) 37 at 41. The claimant referred the Court to the first paragraph of the Exhibit C1, which reads thus – Following series of interviews with you, we are pleased to offer you employment in PZ Cussons Nigeria Plc, as Commercial Export Sales Manager with effect from 4th July 2011 on a 12 (twelve) month renewable fixed term contract basis. To the claimant, it is clear that the clause “subject to encouraging performance” or “good performance” as averred in the defendant’s pleadings was not included in Exhibit C1 which is the proof of the contract between the parties. In Salami v. UBN Plc [2011] 8 WRN 130 CA, Lokulo-Sodipe, JCA held that “it is a truism that a document when admitted in evidence speaks for itself”. Furthermore, that in Anyanwu v. Uzowuaka [2009] 6 – 7 SC (Pt. III) 44 it was held that – The settled principle of law being that oral evidence cannot be allowed to add to, vary or contradict the contents of a document except where fraud in the making of the document is alleged. The claimant then submitted that since the defendant did not allege fraud in Exhibit C1 it is not allowed to add to the word “renewable” or vary it by adding any phrase like “good performance” or “encouraging performance” in its pleadings or in the oral testimony of its witness. That it is also trite law that where there is oral and documentary evidence, documentary evidence should be used as a hanger to assess oral testimony, citing Lawal v. Adebayo [2010] 5 WRN 96 CA and Jinadu Esunro-Aro [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 251) 349 at 382 (incomplete citation). In furtherance of that position, it is the submission of the claimant that words in documents should be given their clear and unambiguous, simple and ordinary grammatical meaning, citing Al-Rissalah P.P Co. Ltd v. El-Houssein [2008] 14 WRN 78 CA and LRCI v. Mohammed [2005] 11 NWLR (Pt. 935) 1. To the claimant then, this Court should hold that the word “renewable” in Exhibit C1 means that the contract of employment between the parties as evidenced by Exhibit C1 is automatically renewable upon the completion of the first term that would end on 3rd July 2012. The claimant further contended that paragraph 5 of Exhibit C1 or D1 is a very important term of the contract between the parties. The said paragraph provides as follows – REPORTING LINE: You will be reporting to the IM & BD Director who will brief you on the details of your responsibilities and also hand you a detailed job Description. That it is trite law that Directors and Managers represent the “directing mind and will” of a company, citing the late Master of Rolls, Lord Denning, who held in Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd v. Graham & Sons [1957] 1 QB 159 that – A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as such. That from the above dictum, the expressions and actions of a Director or a Manager of a company are imputed to the company. Put differently, a Director has the apparent authority to take actions and make decisions on behalf of a company. To the claimant, it, therefore, follows that when he was asked to be reporting to IM & BD Director of the defendant, the defendant was holding the IM & BD Director out as an officer having an apparent authority to take actions and make decisions on behalf of the defendant. That it is clear from the pleadings and oral testimonies of witnesses in this suit that Mr. Aris Kokkinis is a manager of the defendant who has an authority to act as the “directing mind and will” of the defendant. It is, therefore, the submission of the claimant that when Mr. Aris Kokkinis (who is in the capacity to know the status of the claimant in the employment of the defendant) on 18th July 2008 instructed the claimant vide Exhibit xxx (there is no Exhibit xxx frontloaded) to write a letter of gratitude to one Al-Bashir, the defendant had thereby by implication renewed the claimant’s contract as the claimant was made to continue in his job schedule and his employment was not terminated in writing. That in Huble v. Nigerian Maritime Services Ltd [1971] UILR 231, the employee, a German, was employed on a probationary period of six months. When the probationary period expired the employee was not notified that his services were no longer required but was permitted to continue in the same work as during the probationary period. It is trite here that given that the contract of the employment was perfected in writing, the notice for its termination can only be in writing and in the instant case since the defendant failed to give a written notice of termination or non-renewability of the contract, then the contract shall be deemed to have been renewed. It should be noted that the defendant’s witness under cross-examination stated that official matters are communicated mostly in writing while the claimant answered under cross-examination that no letter of termination was served on him up till date. To the claimant, that his official e-mail address was not blocked or suspended as at 18th July 2012 is a further proof that the claimant was still deemed to be in the employment of the defendant even after 3rd July 2012. In addition, the claimant submitted that failure of the defendant to terminate the claimant’s employment in writing and in consideration of the renewability clause in Exhibit C1 the claimant’s employment has been renewed after 3rd July 2012, citing Aigoro v. University of Lagos [1979] 10 – 12 CCHCJ. To the claimant, on the strength of the authorities cited, the wording of the Exhibit C1 and the circumstance of this case, this Court should hold that the claimant’s contract has been renewed after 3rd July 2012. Furthermore, that on the strength of the renewed contract and in line with clause 3 of his contract of employment which states that “severance terms are two (2) months’ notice from either party and the company reserves the right to pay off in lieu of notice if need be”, he (the claimant) therefore became entitled to a severance package consequent to the verbal confirmation of his disengagement given to him by the Head of HR on the 19th July 2012 (two clear weeks after the purported expiry of the initial contract). Further still, that the withholding the claimant’s salaries for the month of June and July 2012 until this present day was in a desperate attempt to force the claimant out of the defendant’s employment thereby occasioning a colossal financial loss to the claimant through the loss of means of his livelihood. On the issue of illegal deductions i.e. the 5% of the claimant’s salary said to be deducted every month by the defendant, the claimant contended that it is apparent that the defendant failed to prove that the said 5% of the claimant’s salary was for tax and it also tendered no material evidence for remittance of such. Section 136 of the Evidence Act 2011 provides that – The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person, but the burden may in the course of a case be shifted from one side to the other. To the claimant, it is clear that the burden of proving that a tax remittance from the salaries of the claimant was done by the defendant was on the defendant and the defendant failed to discharge the said burden. By this, the claim of the claimant for illegally deduction of 5% of his salary by the defendant which the defendant could not prove made the case of the claimant in this regard to stand unchallenged and uncontradicted and same should be deemed admitted and acted upon by the Court, referring to Dr Fayemi & anor v. Olusegun Oni & ors [2010] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1222) 326 at 395. On the claim for medical expenses, the claimant contended that it is clear that he tendered a medical report generated from a general hospital thereby leading evidence to establish this claim. That it is noteworthy that throughout the trial of this suit the claim of N2, 000,000 for medical expenses incurred on the accident he had on 15th May 2012 while carrying out the defendant’s work was specially pleaded and specifically proved and same stands uncontradicted during trial. On the strength of Egbunike v. ACB [1995] 2 NWLR (Pt. 376) at 34 and 35, which enjoins a court to accept an unchallenged evidence as deemed admitted and act on it, the claimant urged the Court to award the said sum of N2, 000,000 to the claimant. On whether the defendant is entitled to the reliefs claimed in its counterclaim, the claimant contended that regarding counterclaim (i) i.e. the return of the defendant’s car with registration number LT 986 EKY, it is the submission of the claimant that since the contract of employment is yet to be validly terminated given that same has been renewed as argued above, the defendant/counterclaimant can only be entitled to a return of the said Kia Cerato Car when the contract between it and the claimant has been validly terminated. That it is clear that under cross-examination the claimant/defendant to the counterclaim testified that no letter of termination was served upon him till date. It is thus trite that unchallenged evidence needs no further proof (Egbunike v. ACB [1995] 2 NWLR (Pt. 376) at 34 and 35). It is, therefore, the submission of the claimant that since there was no letter or notice of termination and the contract was renewable, the contract is still subsisting and thus the claimant is still in lawful possession of the said car. More so, that it is on record that the claimant filed this suit on 3rd August 2012 while the defendant/counterclaimant made a demand for the said car through its solicitors vide a letter dated 23rd August 2012 (three weeks after this Court was seized of jurisdiction over this case). To the claimant, since this matter has been submitted to the Court to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction over the suit (both the main suit and the counterclaim) before the demand was made, the defendant/counterclaimant is bound to wait till final determination of the matter by this Court. The claimant then cited Abdullahi Haruna Esq. v. Kogi State House of Assembly [2010] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1194) 605 at 611, where it was held as follows – It is not permissible for parties to take any step during pendency of the suit which may have effect of foisting upon the court a situation of complete helplessness...Both parties are expected to await the result of the litigation and appropriate order of court before acting further. Once the court is seised of the matter no party has the right to take the matter into his hands. The claimant accordingly submitted that counterclaim (i) fails and same should be dismissed. On counterclaim (ii) i.e. for the sum of N50,000.00 per day and N250,000.00 per week from 4/7/2012 until the car is returned to the defendant being the cost of hiring alternative vehicle for another manager for his job, the claimant contended that this counterclaim is a consequential relief and so must fail. Furthermore, that this claim is a special damage which cannot succeed by only being pleaded specifically but must also be proved strictly. To this end, that the special pleading and strict proof must co-exist, referring to Kopek Construction Ltd v. Ekisola [2010] 3NWLR (Pt. 1182) 618 at 642. That in the absence of such a strict proof, the counterclaim (ii), therefore, fails and same must be dismissed. Regarding counterclaim (iii) i.e. for the sum of N250,000 being the cost of wear and tear occasioned on the car by the illegal usage of the vehicle since 4/7/2012, the claimant contended this claim is also a consequential relief and so must fail. More so, that being a special damage, failure to strictly prove will bar this Court from making an award to the counterclaimant as this Court is not a Father Christmas, citing Kopek Construction Ltd v. Ekisola (supra). The claimant then submitted that counterclaim (iii) fails entirely, urging the Court to so hold. On counterclaim (iv) i.e. for the sum of N100,000.00 for the mobile phones given to the claimant by the defendant for carrying out his duties which he has refused to hand over to the company, the claimant submitted that this counterclaim is ridiculous and an invitation to this Court to do the impossible. That the maxim “lex cogit ad imposiblia” is to the effect that “the court cannot be called to do the impossible”. That the counterclaimant pleaded that it gave official phone to the claimant, even if same is conceded (which was not conceded in the claimant’s pleadings or during trial), the counterclaimant could only claim the said phone (that is even if such claim is valid before the Court) and not claiming money. To the claimant, the question is: did the counterclaimant give One Hundred Thousand Naira to the claimant for that purpose? If it actually gave any phone to the claimant (which the counterclaimant did not prove) and the claimant is bound to return it (if at all) does it expect the claimant to sell the phone and come up with a sum of One Hundred Thousand Naira? It is, therefore, the submission of the claimant that the counterclaimant failed to give evidence to particulars or details of any phone and, as a matter of fact, giving of phone to the claimant was not pleaded except when it was mentioned under the counterclaim as a head of counterclaim. Even in Exhibit D2 where the counterclaimant made a demand from the claimant it only mentioned a car whereas it did not mention anything related or connected to a phone. To the claimant, it is, therefore, in the circumstance of this head of counterclaim and on the strength of Kopek Construction Ltd v. Ekisola (supra) this Court is not unnecessarily gratuitous and thus cannot find a counterclaim of One Hundred Thousand Naira (which was not proved strictly) for the counterclaimant and same should fail and be dismissed accordingly. On counterclaim (v) i.e. for the sum of N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) as general damages for illegal detention of the said vehicle, the claimant contended that this claim is made as general damages. That in the first instance it is on the face of facts of this counterclaim that it is entirely speculative, gold-digging and vexatious and no specific evidence was led to any specific damage suffered by the counterclaimant as a result of the action of the claimant. That the award of general damages is a matter of discretion of the Court even where there is liability; but where there is none, or where none was proved like in this case, the Court is expected to ignore such a baseless claim for general damages, urging the Court to ignore the baseless claim for general damages and dismiss same. On whether Exhibits C4, C8, C9 and Cl0 (being computer-generated evidence) are admissible in evidence, and similarly whether Exhibit C11 being a document made in a foreign language is equally admissible in evidence and if not whether same ought not to be expunged, the claimant first abandoned Exhibit C11, urging the Court to treat it as abandoned. On Exhibits C4, C8, C9 and C10, to the claimant, it is a matter known to our law of Evidence that what allows admissibility of a document is relevancy. As long as it can be established that a document is relevant to prove or disprove a particular claim, such document will be admissible. That it is no doubt that Exhibits C4, C8, C9 and C10 being e-mails exchanged between the claimant, the line manager of the claimant (who is a manager with defendant) and one Al-Bashir involved in the job schedule of the claimant with the defendant are relevant to the determination of this suit. It is, therefore, the submission of the claimant that the said documents being relevant are admissible particularly when they were not objected to during trial. In Ekpe v. Fagbemi [1978] 3SC 209 at 213, the Supreme Court held that “a document tendered without objection at the trial can properly be made use of by the trial court”. More so, that the contemporary judicial attitude is geared towards the evolution of a foundational trial procedure or what may loosely be called functional procedural jurisprudence. This can only be achieved if the Courts deliberately avoid technicalities. There is, indeed, clear evidence that nowadays there is a deliberate departure from procedural formalism or legalism. The trend these days is that Courts as much as possible have tended to depart from strict adherence to technical and mechanical justice. Rather, the current jurisprudential posture emphasizes that at all times substantial justice should be seen to be done to parties and their rights determined on the merits, citing Uwazurike v. AG, Fed. [2007] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1035)1; Jeric (Nig.) Ltd UBN Plc [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt 691) 447; State v. Gwonto [1983] 1 SCNLR 142; Amako v. State [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 399) 11; Akpan v. State [1992] 6 NWLR (Pt. 248) 439; and Olujimi v. Ekiti State House of Assembly [2009] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1153) 464. The claimant then submitted that this Court should give substantial justice that is higher priority over technical justice and treat Exhibits C4, C8, C9 and C10 as admissible. The claimant concluded by urging the Court to grant the claimant’s claims and refuse the counterclaim. The defendant did not file any reply on points of law. I heard learned counsel in the matter and considered all the processes filed. In considering the merit of the case, I need to first resolve the issue of the admissibility of Exhibits C4, C8, C9, C10 and C11 raised and framed as issue (c) in the defendant’s written address. The claimant has already abandoned Exhibit C11, a document written in French but not translated into English. In consequence, Exhibit C11 is accordingly struck out. Regarding Exhibits C4, C8, C9 and C10 (emails and hence computer generated documents), the defendant submitted that the exhibits, being computer generated documents, are not admissible in evidence having regard to section 84(4) of the Evidence Act 2011. Similarly, that section 12(2)(b) of the NIC Act 2006 enjoins this Court to be bound by the Evidence Act. Therefore, the exhibits, having not complied with section 84(4) of the Evidence Act, ought to be expunged from the evidence before this Court. In relying on section 12(2)(b) of the NIC Act 2006, the defendant seems to have deliberately left out the second limb of the provision which permits this Court to “depart from [the Evidence Act] in the interest of justice”. A similar argument had actually been canvassed and rejected by this Court in Lucky Ihanza & anor v. Global Fleet Oil & Gas Limited unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/217/2011 the judgment of which was delivered on March 27, 2013, Mr. Iroko A. Lateef v. Global Fleet Oil & Gas Ltd unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/222/2011 the judgment of which was delivered on May13, 2013 and Mr. Olubayo Adeyemi v. Global Fleet Oil & Gas Ltd [2013] 35 NLLR (Pt. 105) 384 NIC. The defence counsel did not deem it fit to refer to these decisions. In consequence, I see no reason to depart from the reasoning in them. The argument of the defendant against the admissibility of Exhibits C4, C8, C9 and C10, therefore, fails. Exhibits C4, C8, C9 and C10 are accordingly held to be admissible for purposes of this suit. From the claims of the claimant, the issue before the Court is whether there is breach of the contract of employment between the parties as to entitle the claimant to the reliefs he claims. Both parties are agreed as to the fact of the contract of employment between them as evidenced by Exhibit C1 (also frontloaded by the defendant as Exhibit D1). By Exhibit C1, the claimant was offered employment by the defendant “with effect from 4th July 2011 on a 12 (twelve) month renewable fixed term contract basis”. In contracts of employment, courts are enjoined to keep to the terms of engagement as may be agreed upon by the parties. The question that presently arises is the nature of and actual character of Exhibit C1. The claimant urged this Court to hold that the word “renewable” in Exhibit C1 means that the contract of employment between the parties is automatically renewable upon the completion of the first term that was to end on 3rd July 2012. To the defendant, however, Exhibit C1 was to automatically come to an end on 3rd July 2012. In support of his claim, the claimant argued about his continuing in the employment of the defendant until 19th July 2012; and that as at 18th July 2012 his line manager instructed him to prepare a letter of gratitude to one Al-Bashir. See Exhibit C4 and paragraph 1.3 of the claimant’s written address. And under cross-examination, the claimant informed the Court that he “left the company 20th July”. Now, by paragraph 19 of the sworn deposition of the claimant dated 9th August 2012, the claimant himself acknowledged that his employment with the defendant was effectively terminated by the defendant. His words in that paragraph – I immediately informed her that since the defendant had effectively determined my employment from the 15th of June 2011, when I was informed by my line manager, then the Company should only pay me or the month of June and July 2012 but was mandated to pay me my two months in lieu of notice severance benefit as stipulated by the contract of employment. From this piece of evidence, the claimant himself acknowledged that the defendant has terminated his contract of employment. Since the claimant knew that his employment has been effectively determined from 15th June 2012, any work done after that period was done at his risk. The question then of this Court being asked to hold that the word “renewable” in Exhibit C1 means that the contract of employment between the parties is automatically renewable upon the completion of the first term that was to end on 3rd July 2012 does not arise. An employer has the right to terminate a contract of employment. All that would be in issue is what the measure of damages would be if the termination was not done in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment. And here, Isievwore v. NEPA [2002] 13 NWLR (Pt. 784) 417 SC held that where an employee is able to establish that his appointment was wrongly terminated, he would be entitled to damages; and this would be what was due to him for the period of notice. In any case, the claimant under cross-examination testified that Mr. Kokkinis went on leave on 16th June 2012; and that before Mr. Kokkinis left on leave he gave directives to the claimant that he should liaise with the Director of Sales, Mr. Bamidele. This piece of evidence is not in consonance with paragraphs 13 and 14 of the sworn deposition of the claimant dated 9th August 2012. In both paragraphs, the claimant deposed that his line reporting manager (Mr. Kokkinis) informed him that his employment has been terminated and that he should hand over company properties in his possession by the following Tuesday. The seeming contradiction in evidence here cannot be resolved in favour of the claimant. The argument of the claimant that since there was no letter or notice of termination and the contract was renewable the contract is still subsisting is, therefore, not tenable. I accordingly find and hold that there was an effective termination by the defendant of the contract of employment between the parties prior to 3rd July 2012, the last day of the fixed term contract between the parties. The defendant had argued that the claimant’s reporting manager has no ostensible authority to terminate the claimant’s contract of employment, neither has the claimant shown or tendered in evidence any letter of termination by the defendant as he did the letter of appointment (Exhibit C1). Therefore, in the absence of such evidence, that it is safe to conclude that there was no termination of his appointment before his due date of extinction on 3/7/12. That what the claimant was asked to do on 15/6/2012 (which was just 2 weeks to the expiration of the contract) was to start preparing his handover note preparatory to his leaving as it is the policy of the defendant to which he already agreed to comply with in Exhibit D1 or C1. That all employees leaving the defendant’s employment must give disengagement report consequent upon which terminal benefits will be calculated; and that is why the defendant conceded the claim for his salary for June and July which was not paid due to his refusal to submit his handover or disengagement note, and upon which necessary calculations could be premised. The defendant continued that this is contrary to what the claimant signed for at the second page of Exhibit C1 wherein he promised to abide with all company policies which in essence had by law been expressly incorporated into the contract as decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Comptoir Comm & Ind. Ltd v. OGSWC [2002] 9 NWLR (Pt. 773) 629; [2002] FWLR (Pt. 105) 839 SC. The problem here is that the defendant did not frontload any document to indicate what this company policy is. A policy such as this cannot be proved by oral evidence or in the written address of counsel as the defendant seems to have done. Even the decision of the Supreme Court in Comptoir Comm & Ind. Ltd v. OGSWC cited by the defendant talks of the incorporation of ‘other documents’ into the contract of employment in order for them to be construed as part of the contract of employment and so admissible. I, therefore, find it hard to uphold the argument of the defendant in this regard. The evidence of the claimant as to the termination of his employment by the defendant is accordingly more plausible than the submissions of counsel to the defendant. The claimant in reliefs 1 and 2 is praying for two declaratory reliefs. Relief 1 is for “a declaration that the contract of employment dated 4th May 2011 between the claimant and defendant was determined by the defendant on the 15th of May 2012”, while relief 2 is for “a declaration that the defendant is bound by all the terms contained and agreed to in the contract of employment dated 15th May 2012”. By the testimony of the claimant already referred to, the claimant himself acknowledged that his contract of employment was determined by the defendant on 25th June 2012. This Court cannot, therefore, declare that the said contract was determined by the defendant on 15th May 2012. Relief 1 accordingly fails and so is dismissed. Exhibit C1 is dated 4th May 2012. There is no contract of employment dated 15th May 2012 before the Court to warrant the grant of relief 2. Relief 2 accordingly fails and so is dismissed. Having found and held that that the contract of employment of the claimant was effectively determined by the defendant on 15th June 2012, as acknowledged by the claimant himself, it presupposes that the claimant was not allowed to run the full term of his contract. Exhibit C1 is specific in providing that the contract of employment is “with effect from 4th July 2011 on a 12 (twelve) month renewable fixed term contract basis”. The defendant evinced the intention not to renew the contract by terminating it on 15th June 2012 thus leaving out the balance of the period June to July 2012. By College of Education, Ekiadolor v. Osayande [2010] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1191) 423, where a contract of service is for a fixed term, the employee cannot be removed during the period of the term contracted, except for misconduct or where the employee dies; where the contract of an employment is determined before the expiration of the term agreed, the employer shall pay the employee the full salary he would have earned for the period of the fixed contracted term. This rule is reinforced by Shena security Co. Ltd v. Afropak (Nig.) Ltd [2008] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 77 where it was held that where the term of service is pre-determined at the commencement of a contract, notice may or may not be in the contemplation of the parties. In such a situation, the employee cannot be removed during the period of the term contracted except for misconduct or where the employee dies. Where the employer determines the contract before the expiration of the term agreed, the employer shall be made to pay the full salary the employee would have earned for the unexpired period of his fixed contractual term. The defendant acknowledged indebtedness to the claimant for the salary of the months June and July 2012 subject to the return of the company’s properties in his possession. See paragraph 17 of the sworn deposition of DW dated 20th September 2012 and paragraph 3.02 of the defendant’s written address. Based on the acknowledgment of the defendant, therefore, and the fact that Exhibit C1, on severance terms, provides that the defendant “reserves the right to pay off in lieu of notice if need be”, I find and hold that the claimant is entitled to an order directing the defendant to pay to him the sum of N1,741,666.07 (One Million, Seven Hundred and Forty-One Thousand, Six Hundred and Sixty-Six Naira, Seven Kobo) representing the claimant’s salaries for June and July 2012 in terms of both reliefs 3 and 4. As couched, and in a fixed term contract, the claimant cannot claim for both the unexpired period of his contract and for payment in lieu of notice in terms of the measure of damages; and I so hold. The claimant in his sworn deposition of 9th August 2012 acknowledged that the injury he sustained in the course “of his employment with the defendant falls clearly within the contemplation of the new Employee’s Compensation Act and thus the claimant is entitled to requisite compensation”. Now by section 2(2) of the Employee’s Compensation Act 2010, the implementation of the Act and the Fund established under section 56 is vested in the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board. It is to this Board that a deserving employee must apply for compensation. It is when the employee is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board that an appeal shall lie to this Court under section 55(4) of the Act. In relief 5, the claimant is claiming for an order directing the defendant to pay the claimant the sum of N2,000,000 only being payment for medical expenses and damages and trauma occasioned as a result of injury sustained in the course of carrying out his duties at T’Chad. The claimant has not shown to this Court that he approached the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board under the Employee’s Compensation Act for compensation and is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board before filing the present case in this Court. On this score alone, and as regards relief 5, therefore, the claimant is before this Court prematurely. Under cross-examination, the claimant testified that no medical allowance was built into the contract of employment. The claimant went on that it was a separate arrangement, which separate arrangement is not contained in the letter of employment. The document evidencing this separate arrangement has not been shown to the Court. If this separate arrangement was done or made orally, the claimant has not said so or proved it through other means/sources. In consequence, I cannot find and hold that such a separate arrangement actually exists or was entered into by the parties. Relief 5 accordingly fails and so is dismissed. In relief 6, the claimant is claiming for an order directing the defendant to pay him the sum of N550,000 only being refund of the 5% that was illegally deducted every month from the claimant’s salaries throughout the period of his employment with no reasonable explanation or documentation. Now in each of reliefs 3 and 4, the claimant is claiming for the sum of “N1,741,666.7” first as salary for the months of June and July 2012 and then as salary in lieu for the months of August and September 2012. This sum if divided into two gives us N870,8333.35 per month. Exhibit C2 consists of copies of four cheques in the sum of N870,833.33, which the claimant in his sworn deposition said is the evidence of the salary paid to him by the defendant even though on the face of each of the cheques there is nothing to indicate that the cheques were for salaries. This is the case even when there is handwritten on each of the cheques the following words: “for the month of…”; and then the month (November 2011, October 2011, September 2011 and August 2011) is then indicated on the cheque. The question now is, if the claimant is complaining that 5% of his salary was illegally deducted from his monthly salary and he wants it back, why is he claiming in reliefs 3 and 4 a sum that also excludes the said 5%? The argument of the defendant is that the 5% deduction was tax. The claimant answered that this was not supported by any evidence on the part of the defendant. Exhibits C1 in the second paragraph puts the claimant’s gross contract fee at N11 million per annum, which when divided into 12 months will give us approximately N916,666.67 per month. This is not the sum, however, that the claimant is presently claiming. The same second paragraph of Exhibit C1 goes on to state that the N11 million “will be subject to applicable state tax deductions”. What other proof does the claimant want when he himself did not frontload his pay-slip in the strict sense of the word in order to determine what was paid and what was deducted. I believe the defendant that the 5% deducted was the tax due from the claimant; and I so find and hold. Relief 6 accordingly fails and is accordingly dismissed. Relief 7 is for cost of this action. Nothing has been specially shown to the Court by the claimant as to what the cost entails. I note, however, that cost is discretionary (Mobil Prod. Unltd v. Monokpo (No. 2) [2001] FWLR (Pt. 78) 1210) and follows the event (Worno v. UAC Ltd [1956] 1 FSC 33 at 34 and Biode Pharmaceutical Ltd v. Adsell Ltd [1986] 5 NWLR (Pt. 46) 1070). I now turn to the counterclaim of the defendant. In Miss Odiete Hope Ogaga v. Jopa Energy Ltd unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/408/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on March 26, 2014, this Court complained, in the following words, of the actions of counsel in filing counterclaims just for the fun of it – I must state that what the defendant’s counsel did was just to list out heads of reliefs as counterclaims just so that he would be seen to have done something or just so that he would punish the claimant. There is nothing in the case file to indicate an iota of proof regarding any of the reliefs counterclaimed against the claimant. This type of advocacy leaves much to be desired of counsel and puts the legal profession in very bad light. It certainly does not say well of counsel. I must reiterate here that in the instant case, the counterclaims filed by the counsel to the defendant appear to be so filed just for the fun of it. How can one situate a claim for “the sum of N100,000.00 for the mobile phones” given to the claimant (counterclaim iv)? Is it for the cost of the mobile phones (note that the receipt(s) for them were not frontloaded – and by Sommer v. FHA [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt. 219) 551, the value of goods claimed must be proved in terms of the price and date of purchase)? Or is the sum for the value of the usage of the mobile phones? If it is for the usage, how did the defendant arrive at N100,000? How many mobile phones were even given to the claimant in the first place? This is not disclosed by the defendant. Under cross-examination, the claimant acknowledged being given an official car and a Nokia phone. The defendant is not asking for the return of this Nokia phone but for “the sum of N100,000.00 for the mobile phones”. “A Nokia phone” has all of a sudden metamorphosed into “mobile phones”. The defendant was specific, regarding the claim for the car, to ask for “the return of the defendant’s Kia Cerato Car with Registration No. LT 986 EKY”, but regarding “the mobile phones”, the defendant changed to asking for the value without indicating the type(s) of “the mobile phones”. In any event, by Exhibit D2, the defendant did not ask for the return of the mobile phones when it asked for the return of the official car. So, Exhibit D2, at the time it was written and sent to the claimant, could not be proof that mobile phones were given to the claimant. As argued by the claimant, the defendant here could only have claimed for the return of the mobile phone; but that is not the claim of the defendant – and Courts are enjoined not to grant claims or make orders not asked for by parties (Chief Godfrey Onyekwuluni & ors v. Augustine Ndolor & ors [1997] 7 NWLR Pt. 512 250 at 281 – 282). How does one situate a counterclaim for “the sum of N1,000,000.00…as general damages for illegal detention of the said vehicle” (counterclaim v)? Is the defendant claiming in the tort of detinue or conversion; in which event, does this Court even have jurisdiction over same? How did the defendant arrive at the value of N1,000,000? This Court is not told. Furthermore, there is the counterclaim for the sum of N50,000.00 per day and N250,000.00 per week from 4/7/2012 until the car is returned to the defendant being the cost of hiring alternative vehicle for another manager for his job (counterclaim ii). Where are the receipts for the hiring of the alternative vehicle? Who is this “another manager”? I agree with the claimant that this claim is a special damage and can only succeed by not only being specifically pleaded but must also be proved strictly. See Sommer v. FHA (supra), Oladiti v. Sungas Co. Ltd [1994] 1 NWLR (Pt. 321) 433 at 459, Osuji v. Isiocha [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 623, Elochim Nig. Ltd v. Mbadiwe [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 14) 47 and Osijinrin v. Elias [1970] 1 All NLR 153. This, the defendant has not done. Further still, there is the claim for the sum of N250,000 being the cost of wear and tear occasioned on the car by the illegal usage of the vehicle since 4/7/2012 (counterclaim iii). How did the defendant value the cost of the wear and tear of the vehicle to be N250,000? This Court is not told. On the whole, therefore, and on the authority of the Supreme Court decision in University of Jos v. Dr M. C. Ikegwuoha [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 478, reliefs (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) counterclaimed by the defendants are vague and nebulous and so cannot be granted. They accordingly fail and so are dismissed. This leaves out counterclaim (i), which is for the return of the defendant’s Kia Cerato Car with registration No. LT 986 EKY. The claimant is not contesting that it is in possession of the said car. His argument is that his contract of employment is yet to be validly terminated, and so he is entitled to return the car only when the contract of employment is validly terminated. I already held that there is a valid and effective termination of the contract of employment on 15th June 2012. This means that there is a duty on the claimant to return the defendant’s car as demanded. In other word, counterclaim (i) of the defendant succeeds; and I so find and hold. For the reasons given, the claim of the claimant succeeds only in part; and the counterclaim of the defendant also succeeds in part. For the avoidance of doubt, it is the order of this Court that – 1. The defendant shall within 30 days of this judgment pay to the claimant the sum of N1,741,666.07 (One Million, Seven Hundred and Forty-One Thousand, Six Hundred and Sixty-Six Naira, Seven Kobo) only representing the claimant’s salaries for the months of June and July 2012. 2. The claimant shall within 30 days of this judgment return to the defendant the defendant’s Kia Cerato Car with registration No. LT 986 EKY. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip