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The claimant had on 15th December 2011 filed a complaint against the defendant praying for the following reliefs – a) A declaration that the claimant has finally retired from the employment of the defendant having served for 35 years. b) A declaration that having being discharged of all allegations by court, the claimant finally retired from the employment of the defendant in the year 2000. c) An order of court directing the defendant to pay the claimant salary from 1996 – 2000, when he retired. d) An order of court directing the defendant to pay to the claimant all his gratuities, severance packages and arrears of allowance in line with Federal Government standards. e) An order of court directing the defendant to pay to the claimant pension from the year 2000 till date. Accompanying the complaint are the statement of facts, list of witness, list (and copies) of the documents to be relied on at the trial. A counsel appeared for the defendant but no formal appearance was entered; neither was any defence process filed in reaction to the originating processes. At the Court’s sitting of June 14, 2012, the Court noted that the claimant was discharged by the Federal High Court in 2002 but it is in 2011 that the claimant filed the present suit seeking the reliefs he claims in the originating processes, which claims in any event relate to the period of his employment stated by the claimant to have ended in 2000. The question, therefore, arises whether this case is not caught up by the limitation law. Parties were then asked by the Court to address it vide written addresses on this issue. While the claimant filed his written address dated 31st January 2013 but filed on 1st February 2013, the defendant filed nothing. The claimant prefaced his written address with his claims as per the originating processes; but while the originating processes have 5 reliefs claimed from this Court, the claimant introduced a 6th relief in his written address, to wit: “An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from interfering in the claimant duties in the college”. Where this relief is coming from, I really do not know. First, the defendant in the instant case is not a college. Secondly, by the other reliefs of the claimant, the claimant acknowledges that he is out of employment. So the talk of interfering with his duties is uncalled for. Lastly, by introducing a relief at the stage of a written address in respect of an issue as to jurisdiction does not say well of counsel and has no place in advocacy. The claimant framed one issue for the determination of the Court. This is how the claimant framed the sole issue – ...whether the claimant claimed is not statute bar in view of the provisions of section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act. The contention of the claimant is that section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act is not meant to be used as a sword but only as a shield hence it is only raised by a public officer sued after the period of three months in his defence to the action. That in doing so, the law must be specifically pleaded in the statement of defence with sufficient particular which will enable the Court to make a finding that the Public Officers Protection Act will avail the defendant within the circumference of the facts presented to the Court, referring to Elabanjo v. Daudu [2006] NWLR (Pt. 1001) – page is not supplied. To the claimant then, there are no sufficient particulars before the Court from which the Court could make a finding that the defendant is a public officer and that the act being complained against by the claimant was done in pursuance to a law or execution of a public duty or that the defendant has not acted without any legal justification. The claimant went on to submit that this action is not statute-barred as the provision of section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act is not applicable to the claim before the Court, which as can be gleaned from the complaint is a claim for work or labour done as constituted in salary, gratuities and pension of the claimant, who served in the employment of the defendant for 35 years, citing CBN v. Adedeji [2005] 26 WRN 38, which applied Salako v. LEDB 20 All NLR 169, Olatunji v. Commissioner for Land and Housing [2011] 12 WRN 36, FGN v. Zebra [2003] 3 WRN 1, John Ovoh v. Nigeria Westminster Dredging and Marine unreported Suit No. NIC/9/2009, the ruling of which was delivered on 1st April 2008, Dr Aina Simeon Abiodun & 7 ors v. College of Education Oyo unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/46/2009 delivered on “2011/02/08” and CBN v. Amao [2010] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1219) 273 at 295. In CBN v. Amao, the respondent’s grievance was that the amount the appellant was paying as monthly pension was less than what was provided in the Federal Government white paper and circular. The Supreme Court held that in the circumstance, the respondent’s cause of action arose every month the appellant paid to the respondent an amount lesser than the amount stated in the Federal Government white paper and circular. Consequently, the respondent’s action was not statute-barred under section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. The claimant then invited the Court to take judicial notice of the difficulty experienced by retirees in processing their gratuities and pension due to administrative bottleneck being a notorious fact. That applying section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act to a claim for gratuities and pension will expose the public officer to unnecessary litigation even though it is a dispute that would ordinarily be resolved administratively but that the fear of unjust and inequitable application of the Public Officers Protection Act against them may make the employee to quickly commence action within three months at the expense of the limited tax payers’ fund. Hence, the fund that would have been applied to improving the welfare of the people will then be diverted to defending needless and unnecessary litigation. That the Act this becomes counterproductive to the interest of the public officer it sought to protect. The claimant accordingly urged the Court to hold that the subject matter of his claim is one for work and labour as it affects his salary, gratuity and pension and so cannot be caught up by section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act. The claimant proceeded to distinguish Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Committee of Kaduna State [1998] NWLR (Pt. 584) 1 from FGN v. Zebra (supra) arguing that the issue that called for resolution in Ibrahim was not whether the Public Officers Protection Act applies to contract or claim for work and labour done, which the case in Zebra. In similar way, that Olagunju v. PHCN [2011] 4 LPELR – SC.140/2004 delivered on 15th April 2011 is inapplicable to the present case as the issue of whether section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act applies to the issue of claim for salary, gratuities and pension was never brought to the attention of or canvassed before the Supreme Court. That it is the law courts are bound and confined to decide only issues presented to it by parties for adjudication, citing an unreported case of Okon Johnson v. Mobil Producing Nigeria Suit No. CA/C/47/2006 delivered on the 21st May 2009. The claimant also called on the Court to distinguish the instant case from Olagunju v. PHCN (supra) and hold that section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act is inapplicable to the instant case. It is the further submission of the claimant that failure of the defendant to pay him his salaries, gratuities and pension from 2000 till date has not been shown to this Court that it was in pursuance of or execution or intended execution of any law or public duty or authority, citing Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State (supra), Ekeogu v. Aliri [1990] 1 NWLR (Pt. 126) 345 and Ag, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State [2012] 6 – 7 MJSC (III) 149. That there are no facts before the Court suggesting that the failure of the defendant to pay the claimant his entitlement was in pursuance to any law or in execution of any policy of government or any particular public duty hence the protection will not avail the defendant to deny the claimant of just entitlement or otherwise deny the labourer his or her wages. The claimant then submitted that it would be a grave injustice to apply section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act to deny the claimant his gratuity and pension which is a product of 35 years of diligent service to the growth of the defendant without any justification in law. That section 2(a) of the Act is designed to protect a public officer who acted in good faith and does not apply to an act done in abuse of office and with no substance of legal justification, citing Dangana v. Governor of Kwara State [2011] 5 WRN 40 and AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State (supra). The claimant urged the Court to hold that this action comes within the legal exception allowed by the law. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to hold that section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act in not applicable to a claim for salary, gratuities and pension and that this Court is clothed with unfettered jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the claimant. I heard learned counsel in the matter and considered all the processes and submissions advanced. As I indicated earlier, the defendant did not file any defence process; neither did it react to the claimant’s written address on the issue whether this case is statute-barred. This, however, does not mean that the claimant is entitled to an automatic ruling. The claimant is not accordingly absolved from the minimal evidential rule, which is to the effect that a plaintiff cannot assume that he is entitled to automatic judgment just because the other party did not adduce evidence before the trial court as held in Mr. Lawrence Azenabor v. Bayero University, Kano [2011] 25 NLLR (Pt. 70) 45 CA at 69 and Ogunyade v. Oshunkeye [2007] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1057) 218 SC at 247. See also the decisions of this Court in AG, Osun State v. NLC (Osun State Council) & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/275/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on December 19, 2012 and Mr. Joel Adewumi v. Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/IB/18/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on December 16, 2013. So when the claimant for instance argued that section 2(a) of the Act is designed to protect a public officer who acted in good faith and does not apply to an act done in abuse of office and with no substance of legal justification, the claimant was indirectly trying to shift the burden of proof away from himself onto the defendant. Once the issue of the limitation law is raised and the argument of the claimant is that his action comes within any of the exceptions to the limitation law, it is for the claimant to establish that, not for the defendant to disprove it. This is the context in which, for instance, Rahamaniyya United (Nig.) Ltd v. Ministry for Federal Capital Territory & ors [2009] 43 WRN 124 CA at 146, applying the Supreme Court decision in Chigbu v. Tonimas (Nig.) Ltd [2006] 31 WRN 179; [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt. 986) 189 at 210, held that the propriety or otherwise of the act of the defendants is not even a relevant consideration for the applicability of the Public Officers Protection Act. The case continued that if an action against a public officer or public institution and organization is statute-barred having not been brought within the prescribed period of three months, there will be no basis for investigating the conduct of the public officer which gave rise to the action. That the conduct of the defendant as to whether he was malicious or not is irrelevant in determining whether the cause of action is statute-barred under section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act, referring to Egbe v Adefarasin [2002] 14 WRN 57 and Aremo II v. Adekanye [2004] 42 WRN 1 SC. The claimant also argued that there are no sufficient particulars before the Court from which the Court could make a finding that the defendant is a public officer and that the act being complained against by the claimant was done in pursuance to a law or execution of a public duty or that the defendant has not acted without any legal justification. This once again is the claimant trying to shift the burden of proof away from himself. It is the Court that raised the issue of the application of the limitation law. By Popoola Elabanjo v. Chief (Mrs.) Ganiat Dawodu [2006] 6 – 7 SC 24, the period of limitation in any limitation statute is determined by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave rise to the cause of action and by comparing that date with the date on which the writ of summons was filed. If the time on the writ of summons is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, the action is statute-barred. And by Okenwa v. Military Governor of Imo State [1997] 6 NWLR (Pt. 507) 154 at 167, a cause of action accrues on the date on which the incident giving rise to the cause of action arose. A statute of limitation begins to run from the moment the cause of action arose. Thus, for the purpose of instituting an action in Court, time begins to run from the date the cause of action accrues. The case of Mrs. O. Adekoya v. Federal Housing Authority [2008] 4 SC 167 went on to state that a cause of action arises the moment a wrong is done to the plaintiff by the defendant; and the wrong which is the basis of a dispute represents a factual situation which entitles the plaintiff to seek a remedy in a court of law by way of enforcement. From the statement of facts of the claimant in this matter, the following facts are averred to: in 1994, the claimant was “accused of complexities that arose from theft of some property belonging to PHCN” (paragraph 5 of the statement of facts); he was placed on interdiction and thereafter charged to court for alleged stealing (paragraph 6); in 1995, he was recalled from interdiction (paragraph 7); in 1996 his salary was stopped (paragraph 8); the allegation of stealing was dismissed by the Federal High Court on 18th April 2002 (paragraph 9) – by which time the claimant had already reached retirement age in year 2000 (paragraph 10). The claimant is consequently claiming for his salary for the period 1996 – 2000 (relief c), his pension from year 2000 to date (relief e), his gratuities, severance packages and arrears of allowance (relief d) and two declaratory reliefs to the effect that he has retired effective year 2000. The question, therefore, is: when can it be said that the cause of action in this matter arose? Regarding the claim for salary, the cause of action arose when the salary was stopped i.e. 1996 (paragraph 8 of the statement of facts). By LUTH & MB v. Adewole [1998] 5 NWLR (Pt. 550) 406, where the claim is that payment of salaries has been wrongfully withheld, the cause of action accrues from the date the salaries are due for payment; and the liability of the employer does not generally depend on demand for payment. But because the claimant in the instant case was interdicted and the matter was before the Federal High Court, it cannot be said that all that is required for the claimant to come to Court are in place. So when the claimant was discharged on 18th April 2002, all required for him to come to Court was now in place. So the cause of action arose in 2002; and I so find and hold. The same is true of his claim for pension, gratuities, severance packages and arrears of allowance. The claimant could not come to court to claim for any of these reliefs while the case at the Federal High Court subsisted. But as soon as he was discharged by the Federal High Court, his cause of action arose and so he could come to Court; and I so find and hold. The claimant did not, however, come to Court until 15th December 2011 when he filed the instant case in this Court. In other words, the claimant filed this action 9 years after the cause of action arose; and I so find and hold. Whether it is under section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act (which prescribes 3 months), or the limitation laws of States (which prescribe 5 or 6 years), the instant case is way out of the limitation period and so is caught up as such; and I so find and hold. The limitation laws, however, provide for exceptions. It is, therefore, left to the claimant to show the Court how the instant case comes within any of the exceptions to the limitation law. In other words, it is for the claimant to show to the Court the necessary particulars in the originating processes indicating that the defendant acted outside of the colour of its office i.e. not in pursuance to a law or execution of a public duty or without any legal justification. The claimant had suggested that the defendant is not a public officer within the definition of that term for purposes of the limitation law. The defendant is a public institution and the claimant himself cited Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State which recognized public institutions such as the Judicial service Committee of Kaduna State to come within the meaning of public officer under the Public Officers Protection Act. I, therefore, find and hold that the defendant is a public officer for purposes of the Public Officers Protection Act. In the recent cases of Joshua Mnenge v. Nigerian Army unreported Suit No. NICN/IB/22/2012, the ruling of which was delivered on December 18, 2012, Mr. Friday Idugie v. Auchi Polytechnic, Auchi & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/120/2011 the ruling of which was delivered on February 13, 2013 and Hon. Runyi Kanu (JP) & ors v. The Attorney General & Commissioner for Justice Cross River State & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/CA/39/2012 the ruling of which was delivered on March 13, 2013, this Court recognized the defendants as public officers for purposes of the Public Officers Protection law. The claimant argued that a claim for pension, gratuities and severance packages cannot be statute-barred and cited CBN v. Amao and John Ovoh v. Nigeria Westminster Dredging and Marine Company Ltd, amongst other authorities. But I think that there is a misunderstanding of the context in which this decision was given. A similar argument regarding the claim for salary and allowances was made in Hon. Runyi Kanu (JP) & ors v. The Attorney General & Commissioner for Justice Cross River State & ors (supra), and this Court explained the situation thus – In cases of claims for salary and allowances, the decisions of this Court in John Ovoh v. The Nigerian Westminster Dredging & Marine Company Ltd and Captain Tony Oghide and ors v. Shona Jason Nig. Ltd would appear to be good law if the test on “continuance of damage or injury” laid down in the recent Supreme Court decision in AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 144 – 150 is met. In that case, at pages 148 – 149, the Supreme Court held that the case for the deprivation of allocation, which the plaintiff was entitled to every month and same has not ceased, was “a situation continuance of damage or injury which has not ceased”; and so the defence of the Public Officers Protection Act would not avail the 1st defendant who had raised it. I understand this authority to lay down that where an allocation which comes periodically, say, monthly (like salary and allowances, which also come periodically) is deprived a plaintiff State (like salary and allowances deprived to an employee), then there is continuing damage or injury for which the Public Officers Protection Act or Law will not apply. In this sense, for the ‘continuing injury’ exception to apply, the employee would need to be in employment; for otherwise, the claim that the deprivation continues would not stand. In the instant case, the claimants ceased to be in office in 2010. There is, therefore, no question as to the existence of a deprivation of an entitlement which comes in periodically and has not ceased after 2010. This being the case, the claimant in the instant case cannot claim the benefit of the exception to the Public Officers Protection Law of Cross River State. In any event, the definition of the phrase “continuance of the injury” by case law authorities to mean continuance of the “act which caused the injury” and not the injury itself presupposes that this Court’s stance in cases such as John Ovoh v. The Nigerian Westminster Dredging & Marine Company Ltd and Captain Tony Oghide and ors v. Shona Jason Nig. Ltd must be understood qualifiedly. In this sense, CBN v. Amao becomes understandable. In CBN v. Amao, as indicated earlier, the respondent’s grievance was that the amount the appellant was paying as monthly pension was less than what was provided in the Federal Government white paper and circular. The Supreme Court held that in the circumstance, the respondent’s cause of action arose every month the appellant paid to the respondent an amount lesser than the amount stated in the Federal Government white paper and circular. Consequently, the respondent’s action was held not to be statute-barred under section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. In AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor, there was a deprivation of allocation, which the plaintiff was entitled to every month and same has not ceased. In the instant case, the claimant is no longer in employment, having ceased to be so in 2000 although it was in 2002 that his right to go to Court actually accrued. The claimant spent 9 years after 2002 doing nothing to claim his right. The statement of facts and the four frontloaded documents by the claimant (the letter of offer of appointment; proceedings of the Federal High Court dated 18th April 2002; copy of personnel audit in public service; and letter of recall from interdiction) do not indicate that the claimant did anything for the 9 years since his discharge in 2002 to reclaim his entitlements or to show why he could not come to Court within that same period as to justify the non-application of the limitation law. On the whole, I find and hold that this case is caught up by section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act and that none of the exceptions to it applies to the claim of the claimant. The instant case is accordingly statute-barred and so is dismissed. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip