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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE ENUGU JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT ENUGU BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, HONOURABLE JUSTICE AUWAL IBRAHIM DATE: 15th February, 2016 SUIT NO.:NICN/EN/773/2014 BETWEEN: 1. MRS GLADYS ODOGWU 44. MRS VERONICA CHIKA NWOSU 2. MR DAVID O. IBEH 45. MR. MERCILLINUS M. UMUNNAKWE 3. MRS FLORENCE N OBEH 46. MR. ALEXANDER C. IHEKWABA 4. MR COSMAS ONUOHA 47. MR. JOHN OTIGBU 5. MS DEBORA ENE 48. MR. JOACHIN ANYAEGBUNAM 6. MRS ESTHER N. AKWALI 49. MRS FLORENCE E. KEKE 7. MRS IHEUKWUMERE FELICIA N. 50. MR. BENEDICT AGU 8. MRS COMFORT EKWERONU 51. MR. EMMANUEL OGUALAJI 9. MRS REGINA N. OHANEJE 52. MRS VIRGINIA NWUSO 10. MRS ESTHER ANEKE 53. MRS BLESSING IBEH 11. MS VERONICA AMAIFE 54. OHAEME F. I. 12. MRS ALICE EZE U. 55. MRS CHRISTIANA OHAMARA 13. MRS CHRISTIANA EZINWA 56. MR. JOHN O. EYAH 14. MRS GRACE M. NWAUGO 57. MR. PETER I. ELUWA 15. MRS CRYINA N. AMADI 58. MR. FRANK ONAH 16. MRS ANYIONU FELICIA 60. MRS EDITH NEBO 17. MR. GABRIEL OKWUDI 61. MISS SUSSANA NNENNA ODURUKWE 18. MS. COMFORT OGBONNA 62. LETICIA OGBU 19. MR. EJIM LINUS 63. MR. JOHN I. CHUKWU 20. MRS LAURRITTA UGBODIEGWU 64. MRS PEACE ONUOHA 21. MRS CATHRINE ODINYE 65. MRS ANGELINA A. CHUKWURAH 22. MR. JOHNSON AGU 66. MRS BRIDGET OKWALI 23. MRS FELICIA ONYEEGBULE K. 67. MRS BRIDGET OKWALI 24. MRS GRACE A. AMULU 68. EZEH CAROLINE U. 25. MR. THOMAS ENEH 69. MBAH SUSSAN NGOZI 26. MRS AGATHA EDOZIE 70. ZEWIGBO JOSEPHINE 27. MR. JOHNSON AGWU 71. ABARA JULIANA EGO 28. MRS VERONICA EZEIKE 72. ODOEMENAM CHINERE 29. MRS CAROLINE NYENYIRIONWU 73. MADUEKWE F. U. 30. MR. JUDE EZEMUO 74. OWOH GRACE OBIAGELI 31. AUGUSTINA UDEOZO 75. OKONKWO REBECCA 32. BRIDGET OKWALE 76. AGU JOSEPHINE N. 33. MRS MABEL U. H. ODIGWE 77. KALU EGBICHI A. 34. MRS FELICIA EBERE 78. ONWUKA ROWLAND 35. MRS CAROLINE MBA 79. CELESTINE O. AHUNAYA 36. MRS JOSEPHINE N. NWIKE 80. JAMES NNAMUCHI 37. MRS FLORENCE U. AMALU 81. MARTINS EWUZIE 38. MRS ROSE U. AGALA 82. VIRGINIA OGBODO 39. MS. SOPHIA ANUSI 83. OBANANYA HELEN 40. MRS GLADYS EWELAMONYE 84. NWANSI GLADYS 41. MRS CELESTINA N. OKONKWO 85. CHINAWA ELIZABETH 42. MRS AGATHA OKOYE 86. ENEH VIRGINIA 43. MRS FRANSCISCA EZE 87. ISIFE THERESA 88. OFOHA FANNY 89. OPARAOCHA CHRISTIANA 137. ONYIA MERCILLIAN 90. EZEALA CHINERE U. 138. MRS NEBOM 91. NWANZE ELIZABETH 139. MRS EGBO COMFORT N. 92. OHAMARA ANDREW 140. MRS MADUKWE COMFORT 93. ISIGUZO PAULINE 141 MRS AGU EUCHARIA 94. MGBGWU SCHOLASTICA 142. MRS ANUO FELICINA 95. EBEDE VICTORIA 143. MRS ALICHE GRACE 96. UGWU GRACE 144. MRS NWOKENTA I. 97. NWAOSU REGINA 145. MRS OKEKE BRIDGET 98. MBA GRACE 146. OBINWANNE ANGELINA 99. ONYEGBULE CORNELIUS 147. MRS ENEZE V.E. 100. EZEUGWU OLI 148. MRS DIBIA 101. ENEH COMFORT 149. MRS AGU JULIANA O. 102. OBIOHA ROSELINE 150. MRS ONYEKWERE CHINYERE 103. UDABA JULIANA 151. MRS ANOSIKE FRANCISCA 104. OKEKE CATHERINE U. 152. MRS EZE FELICIA 105. UJAH CLEMENTINA 153. MR. ANOSIKE LAZARUS 106. AWA COMFORT 154. ENEAGU JESSIE UZOAMAKA 107. ONYIA VICTORIA 155. MR. FESTUS ELECHI 108. AMERIBE JANET 156. JOSEPH ANEDIOBI 109. OFODUM ROSELINE A. 157. PETER ONWUMERE 110. ORJIEKWE GRACE E. 158. MR. PATRICK OKORO 111. OKOLONKWO AUGUSTINA 159. MR. IWUOHA ALBAN 112. AJIKE ENYIDIYA 160. MR. UGWU ANTHONY 113. ONYIA CHRISTIANA C. 161. MRS UGADA JOSEPHINE 114. OBODO CATHRINE 162. MRS UDEH G. 115. ODUM THERESA 163. OZOEMENE BENEDETH 116. IRO CHRISTY 164. MRS EZE MABEL 117. CHIOKE VICTORIA 165. MR. AKALUEKWE SYLVANUS 118. NGWUEKE PATRICIA 166. MRS ANALECHI 119. OGBUCH MARY 167. MRS OKONKWO V. 120. MRS PATRICIA UGWUOZOR 168. MRS CHIWETARA ALICE 121. OKOYE BEATRICE 169. MRS ATU ROSE 122. OGBONNA THERESA 170. UDENWEZE OBY 123. CHIBUKO VICTORIA 171. MR. EZE IGNATIUS 124. CHIOKE MAGRET 172. MRS NWADIUTOR IJEOMA O. 125. NGWUEKE PATRICIA 173. MRS IKONNE BESSIE 126. MRS PATRICIA UGWUOJOR 174. MRS ANTHONIA CHIGBO 127. OKOYE BEATRICE 175. MRS UDE GENEVIENE 128. OGBONNA THERESA 176. MRS OKEKE CAMELITA 129. MRS CHIKELU LAWRENCE 177. MRS OGBO VIRGINIA 130. MRS EZEH PHILOMENA 178. ANALECHI IJEOMA 131. MRS NWAFOR ANNA 179. OZURUMBA G.A. 132. MRS UKPAI OMASIRE 180. MRS OGUZIA EUGINIA 133. MRS OFFIA THERESA 181. MRS AMADI THERESA 134. MRS EJIOFOR LILIAN 135. MRS ODUMUKO CHARITY ======================== CLAIMANTS 136. MRS EGBO COMFORT AND UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA TEACHING HOSPITAL (UNTH)======== DEFENDANT REPRESENTATION: C.I. Enechi Onyia Esq. with C.F. Eneh (Mrs) appeared for the Claimants/Respondents. Stella Okolo (Miss) appeared with Lucky ObodoEsq for the Defendant/Applicant. RULING The Claimants in this suit took out a Complaint dated 21st day of July, 2014 but filed on 15th day of September, 2014. In paragraph 23 of their Statement of Claim they pray the Honourable Court against the Defendant certain reliefs as follows: 23. WHEREFORE the Claimants claim as follows: i. A declaration that the claimants are entitled to their rights, allowances and privileges which accrued/accrues to them as benefit in their respective posts of employment. ii. An order directing the defendant to calculate and pay the claimants their respective arrears of salaries, gratuities and privileges unpaid. iii. An order directing the defendant to carry out the directives of the Federal Government in circulars and those of the defendant regarding the Claimants service conditions as employees and retirees. iv. N500,000,000.00 (five hundred million Naira) damages. The Complaint is accompanied with a Statement of Claim, Statement on Oath of witnesses, list of witnesses, list of and copies of documents to be relied on at the trial. Upon being served with the originating processes of the Claimants, the defendants filed a notice of Preliminary Objection dated 20th January, 2015 but filed on 13th February, 2015 challenging the competence of the suit. The grounds of the objection are that: 1. The action is statute barred. 2. The suit is incompetent and this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain and/or proceed with the hearing of the suit. The said notice of preliminary objection is accompanied by an affidavit of 9 paragraphs deposed to by Mr Godwin Ani, a Higher Executive Officer in the Administrative Department of the Defendant. It is also accompanied with a written address in support. Upon being served with the said notice of preliminary objection, on 24th February, 2015 the Claimants filed to a Counter-Affidavit of 8 paragraphs deposed to by Marcellinus Umunnakwe, the 45th Claimant on record in this suit. There is a written address in opposition to the preliminary objection. The Defendant on 26th February, 2015 filed a reply on points of law. However, on the 27th day of May, 2015 the Court suo motu asked the parties to address it on the propriety of the defendant’s reliance on Section 7(1)(a) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522, LFN, 1990. Parties filed their respective written addresses and this is the decision of the court in this matter of preliminary objection. In the Written Address of the Defendant, its learned counsel stated that Section 7(1)(a) & (e) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522 LFN 1990, provides that: The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued- (a) actions founded on simple contract… (e) actions to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of an enactment other than- i. a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture. ii. a sum due to a registered company by a member thereof under its articles of association. iii. any amount recoverable against concurrent wrongdoers under a civil liability enactment for the time being in force relating to concurrent wrong doers. Learned counsel then submitted that the relationship between the defendant/applicant and the claimants is based on simple contract of employment. Counsel referred to Mozley&Whiteley’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition by John Saunders @ page defines which defines contract thus: A contract …is said to be “an agreement between competent persons, upon a legal consideration, to do or abstain from doing some act”; or more shortly as “an agreement enforceable at law.” The agreement may be parol, that is by word of mouth, or writing not under seal;…A contract must be made upon a consideration, in order that an action may be founded upon it. He continued that the Supreme Court in the case of Bilante Int’l Ltd vs NDIC (2011) 15 NWLR @ Ratio 1 (P.425, paras. C-D) on the meaning and essentials of contract held that: A contract is defined as an agreement between two or more persons which creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing. Its essentials are competent parties, subject matter, a legal consideration, mutuality of agreement and mutuality of obligation. Counsel then stated that he had taken to elementary meaning of what a contract is in order to accord credence to Section 7(1)(a) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522 LFN 1990 in submitting that the relationship between the claimant and the defendant/applicant is that of a simple contract which, an intention to create legal relation being a core part of, is subject to the strict provisions of the statute of limitation. That paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the Claimants’ Statement of Claim also confirm such status of a contract of employment between the claimants and the defendant/applicant. That Section 7(1)(a) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522, LFN 1990 provides that any action bothering on such simple contract must be instituted within six years of the occurrence of such cause of action. That the claims of the claimants in this suit relate back to the year 2005; upon purported recommendations spanning a period of nine years. That section 7(1)(e) of the Limitaion Act Cap 522 LFN 1990 provides also that actions to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of an enactment other than- i. a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture. ii. a sum due to a registered company by a member thereof under its articles of association. iii. … He continued that a careful perusal of the claims of the Claimants in this suit only reveals them as retired employees of the defendant/applicant, now pensioners; not in any way included in the above category of those allowed exceptionally to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of an enactment at the expiration of six years of the existence of such recoverable sum. That the Supreme Court in the case of Adekoya vs Federal Housing Authority (2008) 4 SC pg 167, Per Tobi, JSC, held that, A cause of action is said to be statute barred if in respect of it, proceedings cannot be brought because the period laid down by the Limitation Act or Law has elapsed. Limitation of Action is determined by looking at the Writ of Summons or the Statement of Claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the Plaintiff the cause of action and by comparing that date on which the Writ of Summons was filed. See also Egbe vs The Ho. Justice Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1. The court further held in that case that: A plea by a defendant in any case that the action is statute barred is a plea which raises the issue of jurisdiction and which determinant is the writ of summons and the statement of claim. That in the case of Williams vs Williams (2008) 4-5 SC (Pt. II) p. 253, the Supreme Court also held that: That the general principle of law provides for the bringing of an action within a prescribed period in respect of a cause of action, accruing to the plaintiff, proceedings shall not be brought outside the period prescribed by law. That period of limitation is only determinable by looking at the writ of summons and statement of claim alone to ascertain the alleged date of the wrong in question which gave rise to the plaintiff’s cause of action and by comparing that date with the date in which the writ was filed and that if the time pleaded in the writ of summons or the statement of claim is beyond the period allowed by the Limitation Law, the action is statute barred. Learned counsel further relied on Chief Samson Okon Ito 7 Anor vs Chief Okon Udo Ekpe& Anor (2000) 75 LRCN 359 @ 374, that, clearly where an action is statute barred a Claimant who might otherwise have had a cause of action loses the right to enforce it by judicial process because the period of time laid down has elapsed. See the case of Williams vs Williams (supra). He continued that the Court of Appeal has held in the case of Nduka vs Ogbonna (2011) 1NWLR (Pt. 1227)p. 153, that: Where a defendant raises a defence that the plaintiff’s action is statute barred and the defence is sustained by the Court, the proper order that the trial court is expected to make is an order of dismissal of the action but not merely striking it out. See also Egbe vs Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47)1, NPA vs Lotus Plastic Ltd (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 158. Learned counsel then submitted that the claimants in this suit are statutorily barred by the law from bringing this action against the defendant/applicant. Consequent upon the above, this court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this case. That the Court, in Madukolu vs Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 241 held that: A court is competent when the case coming before the court was initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. In this case the requirement that it has to be ‘live case’ is not there so the condition precedent is not available and that is when an action is statute barred as contended. In lien with the above, in SLB Consortium Ltd vs Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) p. 317 at 322,held that a court without jurisdiction to hear and determine a case cannot confer jurisdiction on itself. Also in the case of Mark vs Eke (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) at 54, the Court held that: A court is competent to assume jurisdiction on any cause or matter in the following circumstances- a) When it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of members of the Bench. b) When the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction c) When the case comes before the court initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction (Underlining is learned Counsel’s). Counsel continued that one of the documents attached as exhibit attached by the Claimants is a letter dated 18th October, 2009 wherein the Hospital that is, the Applicant in this acknowledged the complaint by 10 complainants out of which only 9 are parties in this incompetent suit to wit, 68th, 69th, 70th , 71st , 72nd, 92nd , 116th& 129th claimants. The said letter does not in any way resurrect a dead case. He refers to NNPC vs Iorshase (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 403) 1299 at 132 Paras A-B and EBOIGBEvs NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649 the Court held that “limitation time continues to run even if the parties are engaged in negotiations for settlement, except there is reasonable settlement of the dispute or admission of liability by the defendant. Counsel submitted that in this case there was neither a reasonable settlement of the dispute nor admission of liability by the defendant to justify waiving statute of limitation. Learned counsel the urged the court to dismiss this case in limine for being incompetent based on the fact that it is caught by the statute of limitation. On his own part, learned claimants’ counsel in his own written address in opposition to the preliminary objection stated that cause of action is defined as the facts or fact which establish(es) or give(s) rise to a right of action. It is the factual situation which gives a person a right to judicial relief or which, if substantiated entitles the claimant to a remedy against the defendant relying on Egbe vs Adefarasin (1987) 1 ALL NLR 1; Sanda vs Kukawa Local Government (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 174) 379. That from the Statement of Claim of the Claimants it can be seen that the failure to grant the claimants their due and payable rights and interests by their employer. (sic). The refusal continued up to date of instituting of this claim and continues the damages have not ceased. That it is trite law that where the failure of the defendants to pay the claimants as required by law which started on 1st day of January, 2005 being continuous and has not ceased by statute of limitation. He referred to Adigun vs Ayinde (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 313) 56; Sanda vs Kukawa Local Government, supra, referred to in the case of NNPC vs Sele (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 866) 377 and distinguished at pages 42 paras CJ 413 paras 414-465 paras H-G. He continued that the objection of the defendant/applicant against this suit before the Honourable Court is misconceived and without any merit. He urged the court to dismiss the application. He added that in view of the fact that there is no defence filed in this suit he urged the court also to enter judgment in favour of the Claimants which claims are as shown herein. Learned counsel for the claimants continued that the defendant/applicant relied on Section 7(1)(a) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522 LFN 1990 to bring the notice of Preliminary Objection and he submitted that the said section of the law was cited out of context as the provisions of the law have no nexus and therefore not applicable to this case. That Section 7(1)(a) of the Limitation Act, supra, mentions a simple contract; Black’s Law Dictionary 9th Edition referred to simple contract to be informal and Parol contract at p. 373. Black’s Law Dictionary (supra) p. 370 defined informal contract to be “a contract other than one under Seal, a recognizance, or a negotiable instrument; that derives its force not from the observance of formalities but because of the presence in the transaction of certain elements that are usually present when people make promises with binding intent naively mutual assent and consideration (or device other than consideration”. Informal contract may or may not be in writing. See Parol Contract at p. 371. Parol Contract is a contract or modification of a contract that is not in writing-also termed oral contract; parol agreement (loosely) verbal contract”. With regard to the definition given to simple contract even by the defence counsel and the definition from Black’s Law Dictionary one can rightly say that the relationship between the claimants and the defendant is merely founded on simple contract. In distinguishing between formal contract and simple contract, the major distinction is that in simple contract, only a party who has furnished consideration can bring an action to enforce a simple contract. The entirety of the defence argument was centered on Section 7(1)(a) of the Limitation Law, supra. The position of the above quoted section intends to oust the jurisdiction of the court where the time stated thereunder has elapsed. The fact still remains that the above law is not in any way applicable to this case as the law was cited out of context. The learned Defendant’s counsel filed a reply on points of law. The main point made by learned counsel is that the contention of the claimants’ counsel that Section 7(1)(a) of the Limitation Act is not applicable to this case is misconceived. He referred to Section 91 of the Labour Act which according to counsel for the defendant recognizes a contract of employment as a simple contract which can be in any form, whether written or oral, implied or expressed, so far as the necessary elements of a valid contract are present. That the contractual relationship between the defendant and the claimants was no different. He also referred toShona Security Co. Ltd vs Afropak (Nig) Ltd 7 Ors (2008) 164 LRCN 36 at 49 FK. All the other points made by learned counsel are more of re-argument of its earlier position. The parties equally filed respective addresses pursuant to the directive of court to address it on the issue of Limitation Act, Cap 522, LFN 1990. Learned Defendant’s counsel filed a written address dated 1st day of June 2015 on the 4th day of June, 2015. Learned counsel essentially submitted that the omission of the said Limitation Act, Cap 522, LFN 1990 from the Laws of the Federation, 2004, has not affected the validity of the said statute and is still applicable. Counsel placed reliance on FCDA 7 Anor vs Kuda Engineering and Construction Company Limited & Ors (2014) LPELR-22985, Ibidapo vs Lufthansa Airlines (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 498) 124 and Raleigh Industries (Nig) Limited vs Nwaiwu (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 341) 760. On his part the learned counsel for the Claimants filed a process on 15th June, 2015 which was supposedly in reaction to the directive of court. He also filed added authorities on 14th June, 2015. In the added authorities counsel referred the court to the decision in Alefune Joseph Okafor & Ors vs Bureau of Public Enterprises & 5 Ors (Unreported) Suit No. NICN/EN/163/2012 Ruling in which was delivered on 19th day of March, 2014. Subsequently, the learned defendant’s counsel filed yet another process on points of law in relation to the point of address directed by the Court. I have carefully considered the processes filed, the arguments and submissions of counsel in the application before the Honourable Court. The issue for determination is simply whether this is statute barred by reason of having been filed outside the limitation time of six years stipulated in Section 7(1)(a) and (e) of the Limitation Law, Cap 522, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 1990. Let me start by disposing off the issue raised by the Court suo motu on the validity or otherwise of Limitation Act, Cap 522, LFN 1990 on which the parties were asked to file written addresses. From the submissions made by both counsel I am satisfied that the said Limitation Act is subsisting despite its being omitted from the 2004 published volumes of the LFN. This is because going by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ibidapo vs Lufthansa Airlines (1997) LPELR-1397 (SC) at p. 30 paras C-F, where it was held that in the absence of a clear repeal of a statute or the existence of another one such that both cannot function at the same time, the statute would continue to remain in force. Therefore its omission from the compiled volumes of the laws of the Federation will not make it to cease to exist. With regard to the specific statute in question, namely, Section 7(1)(a) of Limitation Act, Cap 522, LFN 1990, same was applied by the Court of Appeal in a 2014 decision in the case of FCDA & ANOR vs KUDA ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED & ORS (2014) LPELR-22985 (CA). See also Raleigh Industries (Nig) Limited vs Nwaiwu (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 341) 760. I therefore hold that the Limitation Act is validly relied upon by the Defendant in its preliminary objection in this case. Turning to the main issue for determination now, a suit is said to be statute barred if it is brought outside the limitation period set by statute within which to bring it. The manner by which it is determined is to look at the date on which the cause of action accrued and compare that with the date on which the suit was filed. If the date on which it was filed shows that the period set by the limitation law within which it should have been brought is exceeded, then the suit must be declared statute barred and dismissed. This much is quite trite. What is equally trite is the fact that in order to determine whether the suit is statute barred or not, the court is only enjoined to look at the Originating Processes of the Claimant, i.e., for instance, the Writ of Summons, the Statement of Claim and the date on the face of the Originating Processes showing when it was filed. See Adekoya vs Federal Housing Authority (2008), supra, and Egbe vs Adefarasin (1987), supra.In Adekoya’s case, His Lordship, Niki Tobi JSC made the point thus: A cause of action is said to be statute barred if in respect of it, proceedings cannot be brought because the period laid down by the Limitation Act or Law has elapsed. Limitation of Action is determined by looking at the Writ of Summons or the Statement of Claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the Plaintiff the cause of action and by comparing that date on which the Writ of Summons was filed. In Williams vs Williams (2008), supra, the point was made as follows: That the general principle of law provides for the bringing of an action within a prescribed period in respect of a cause of action, accruing to the plaintiff, proceedings shall not be brought outside the period prescribed by law. That period of limitation is only determinable by looking at the writ of summons and statement of claim alone to ascertain the alleged date of the wrong in question which gave rise to the plaintiff’s cause of action and by comparing that date with the date in which the writ was filed and that if the time pleaded in the writ of summons or the statement of claim is beyond the period allowed by the Limitation Law, the action is statute barred. In the case at hand, the Claimants have averred in their Statement of Claim that they have variously retired from service and that before their retirements they were variously promoted but were refused payment of their respective entitlements from date of conversion or promotion and thereby denying them their wages, rights and interests as granted by their conditions of service. The effective date for the implementation of the recommendations of an ad-hoc committee set up to review the implementation of relevant circulars was put at 2005. The payments were to be made as from 2005. The reliefs sought were for orders that compel the defendant to calculate and pay the claimants their entitlements from 1st January, 2005. See paragraphs 5, 9, 11, 12, 14 and 23 of the Statement of Claim. From my understanding of the Claimants’ Claim the cause of action arose in 1984 and in 2005. The learned Claimants’ counsel has tried to argue that the cause of action had arisen in 2009 and 2013 when they were meetings and letter written to the Defendant respectively. Here the point has to be made that communications and negotiations after the cause of action has arisen cannot stop limitation time from running. This is the position of the law as rightly captured by the learned defendant’s counsel. See Lagos State Government & Ors vs Pastor Joseph Olayinka Martins (2015) LPELR-24580 (CA) p. 29 paras D-F and John Eboigbe vs NNPC (1994) LPELR-992(SC), Per ADIO JSC at 13-14, paras F-E. Therefore the averments in paragraphs 16, 17, 20, 21 are of no moment. I accordingly find that the cause of action arose in 1984 and 2005. The next question is when the Claimants came to court. I have earlier in this Ruling stated that they filed this suit on 15th day of September, 2014. The relevant law, i.e., the Limitation Act, Cap 522, LFN 1990, in Section 7(1) (a) and (e) has provided that the claimants must come to court within six years. But before concluding on this point let me address the issue of the applicability or otherwise of the said Limitation Act to this suit as raised by the Claimants. Their learned counsel has submitted that the said provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the case of the Claimants because their contract is that of contract of employment. He relied on the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary and the learned Defendant’s counsel also relied on a dictionary definition of contract. To the Defendant the provisions are applicable because the contract of the Claimants was that of employment and therefore basically a simple contract. The Claimants’ analysis also ended up in showing that the contract of the Claimants with the defendant is also a simple contract. But the more important point is that going by the provisions of Section 91 of the Labour Act, Cap L1, LFN 2004, has defined a contract of employment as “any agreement, whether oral or written, express or implied, whereby one person agrees to employ another as a worker and that other person agrees to serve the employer as worker”. From what is before the court, the contract of employment of each of the Claimants is a simple contract which must therefore be caught by the provisions of Section7 (1)(a) and (e) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522, LFN 1990. This I so find.